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Abstract 
The US suffers from large regional disparities in employment rates which have persisted for many 
decades. It has been argued that foreign migration offers a remedy: it “greases the wheels” of the 
labor market by accelerating the adjustment of local population. Remarkably, I find that new migrants 
account for 30 to 60 percent of the average population response to local demand shocks since 1960. 
However, population growth is not significantly more responsive in locations better supplied by new 
migrants: the larger foreign contribution is almost entirely offset by a reduced contribution from 
internal mobility. This is fundamentally a story of “crowding out”: I estimate that new foreign 
migrants to a commuting zone crowd out existing US residents one-for-one. The magnitude of this 
effect is puzzling, and it may be somewhat overstated by undercoverage of migrants in the census. 
Nevertheless, it appears to conflict with much of the existing literature, and I attempt to explain why. 
Methodologically, I offer tools to identify the local impact of immigration in the context of local 
dynamics. 
 
 
 
Key words: migration, geographical mobility, local labor markets, employment 
JEL Codes: J61; J64; R23 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
I am grateful to Alan Manning for his guidance, and to Christoph Albert, George Borjas, David Card, 
Christian Dustmann, Ori Heffetz, Guy Michaels, Giovanni Peri, Jonathan Portes and Jan Stuhler for 
helpful comments, as well as participants of the CEP (2015), RES (2016), OECD-CEPII 
“Immigration in OECD Countries” (2017), GSE Summer Forum (2018), CEPR-EBRD (2018) and 
IZA Annual Migration Meeting (2018) conferences, and seminars at IDC Herzliya, Bar Ilan, Hebrew 
University (Mount Scopus and Rehovot) and Bank of Israel. I also thank Jack DeWaard, Joe Grover, 
Kin Koerber and Jordan Rappaport for sharing data. 
Michael Amior, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics. 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 M. Amior, submitted 2018. 
1 Introduction
The US suffers from large regional disparities in employment-population ratios (from
here on, “employment rates”) which have persisted for many decades (Kline and Moretti,
2013; Amior and Manning, 2018). Concern has grown about these inequities in light of
the Great Recession and a secular decline in manufacturing employment (Kroft and Pope,
2014; Acemoglu et al., 2016), whose impact has been heavily concentrated geographically
(Moretti, 2012; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013). In principle, these disparities should
be eliminated by regional mobility, but this has itself been in secular decline in recent
decades (Molloy, Smith and Wozniak, 2011; Dao, Furceri and Loungani, 2017; Kaplan
and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2017).
In the face of these challenges, it has famously been argued that foreign migration
offers a remedy. Borjas (2001) claims that new immigrants “grease the wheels” of the
labor market: given they have already incurred the fixed cost of moving, they are very
responsive to regional differences in economic opportunity - and therefore accelerate local
population adjustment.1 And in groundbreaking work on the Great Recession period,
Cadena and Kovak (2016) argue further that foreign-born workers (or at least low skilled
Mexicans) continue to “grease the wheels” even some years after arrival. In terms of
policy, if migrants are indeed regionally flexible, forcibly dispersing them within receiving
countries may actually hurt natives as well as the migrants themselves.2 Basso, Peri
and Rahman (2017) have extended the hypothesis beyond geography: they find that
immigration attenuates the impact of technical change on local skill differentials.
I revisit the original question of geographical adjustment using decadal US data span-
ning 722 commuting zones (CZs) and 50 years - and using an empirical model which
explicitly accounts for dynamic adjustment. Remarkably, I find that foreign migrants
(and specifically new arrivals) account for around half of the average population response
to local demand shocks. But in areas better supplied by new migrants, population growth
is not significantly larger nor more responsive to these shocks. I claim that foreign mi-
gration crowds out the contribution from internal mobility that would have materialized
in the counterfactual. This is not to say that natives gain little from the contribution
of foreign migration. As I argue below, undercoverage of unauthorized migrants in the
census may overstate the crowding out effect - and understate the foreign contribution to
adjustment. And in any case, conditional on the overall level of immigration, a regionally
1Borjas (1999), Card and Lewis (2007), Jaeger (2007), Kerr (2010), Cadena (2013, 2014), Basso, Peri
and Rahman (2017), Beerli, Indergand and Kunz (2017) and Albert and Monras (2018) offer additional
evidence that new migrants’ location decisions respond strongly to local economic conditions. The idea
of “greasing the wheels” is not limited to immigration: Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) find
that older workers (who supply labor elastically) protect the employment of younger workers (who supply
labor inelastically) in the event of adverse shocks.
2Fasani, Frattini and Minale (2018) find adverse effects of such dispersal policies on the wages of
asylum seekers in Europe.
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flexible migrant workforce may save natives from incurring potentially steep moving costs
themselves. As Molloy, Smith and Wozniak (2017) suggest, this may in principle shed a
more positive light on the decline in regional mobility since the 1980s.
I underpin these results with a dynamic model of local labor market adjustment which
builds on Amior and Manning (2018). I define local equilibrium for a given population us-
ing a competitive Rosen-Roback framework (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982). Workers move
to higher-utility areas, but this process takes time; and new to this paper, I distinguish
between the contributions of foreign and internal migration. To the extent that foreign
inflows are responsive to local conditions, local utility differentials will be narrower at
any point in time. But this will discourage existing residents from themselves relocat-
ing over the path of adjustment. Crucially, as internal population flows become more
sensitive, their contribution to local adjustment will be increasingly (and in the limit,
fully) “crowded out”. In other words, foreign migration will only “grease the wheels” (i.e.
accelerate local population adjustment) if the wheels are not already greased.
The model yields an “error correction” specification, where decadal changes in log
population depend on contemporaneous changes in log employment and the lagged log
employment rate (the initial deviation from steady-state). Amior and Manning show the
employment rate can serve as a “sufficient statistic” for local economic opportunity, as
an alternative to the more common real consumption wage (which is notoriously difficult
to measure for detailed local geographies). This approach already has precedent in the
migration literature: Pischke and Velling (1997) control for lagged unemployment when
estimating local labor market effects. In an effort to exclude supply shocks, I instrument
the employment change and lagged employment rate with current and lagged Bartik
(1991) industry shift-shares. And new to this paper, I adjust local employment rates for
demographic composition: this is to account for heterogeneous preferences for leisure, not
least between natives and foreign-born individuals (see Borjas, 2016).
The model fits the data well. On average, population responds to the current employ-
ment change and lagged employment rate with elasticities of 0.75 and 0.55 respectively:
i.e. large but incomplete adjustment over one decade. Remarkably, new foreign migrants
(arriving within the decadal interval) account for over 30 per cent of the former effect and
close to 60 per cent of the latter - despite accounting for just 4 percent of the population.
Interestingly, this is partly explained by the well-documented preference of new migrants
to settle in large co-patriot communities. Conveniently, these communities are dispro-
portionately located in high-employment areas: itself a consequence of persistent local
demand shocks. Nevertheless, existing US residents also make a substantial contribution
to adjustment, and this is almost entirely due to natives. The latter result appears to
be at odds with Cadena and Kovak (2016): at least among the low educated, they find
that the local native population is inelastic. In Appendix H, I attempt to reconcile our
results: once I account for local dynamics, I do identify a large native response even in
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their data.
To study the implications of foreign migration for overall population adjustment, I
exploit variation across space and time in the supply of new migrants - building on the
methodology of Cadena and Kovak (2016) and also Basso, Peri and Rahman (2017). I
identify the local supply using the migrant shift-share popularized by Altonji and Card
(1991) and Card (2001). This predicts the local foreign inflow by allocating new arrivals
from each origin country to CZs according to the initial spatial distribution of co-patriot
communities. Surprisingly, I cannot reject the hypothesis that population growth is no
larger - and responds to shocks no faster - in CZs better supplied by new migrants. The
larger foreign contribution to adjustment in these areas is almost entirely offset by a
reduced contribution from internal mobility - and specifically from natives. Thus, unlike
Cadena and Kovak (2016), I do not find that foreign migrants smooth local employment
rates: neither those of natives, nor those of the migrants themselves.
This analysis of the impact of the migrant shift-share can be seen as “reduced form”:
it makes no claims on the underlying mechanisms. My “structural” interpretation is
that realized foreign inflows are crowding out internal reallocation. In the second part of
the paper, I impose this interpretation more explicitly, identifying the impact of realized
foreign inflows themselves - and now using the migrant shift-share as an instrument.
I estimate that each new foreign arrival to a CZ crowds out one existing US resident
(or more precisely, 1.1), with a standard error of just 0.13. Appendix E.4 shows the
effect is entirely driven by a reduction in internal inflows rather than larger outflows,
consistent with Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) - and hence my preference for
the “crowding out” terminology over (the more typical) “displacement”. This analysis is
based on CZs; but in Appendix E.5, I cannot reject one-for-one crowd-out across US states
either. As Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) note, this result has broader methodological
implications: local estimates of the impact of immigration may then understate any
aggregate-level effect.
Of course, there are important threats to identifications. I do find substantial crowding
out effects in each individual decade, though they disappear in some cases when I remove
right hand side controls (both demand proxies and local climate). The importance of these
controls is to be expected, given the limitations of the migrant shift-share instrument. In
a world with persistent shocks or sluggish adjustment, it may be positively correlated with
local utility (Pischke and Velling, 1997; Borjas, 1999); and to the extent that these effects
are unobserved, this may bias the crowding out estimate towards zero. A related concern,
raised by Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler (2018), is strong local persistence in the instrument
itself - which makes it difficult to disentangle the impact of current and historical foreign
inflows. But in principle, the lagged employment rate control should account for the
entire history of shocks (including past foreign inflows), and further exploration of the
dynamics suggests it is performing its function well. These concerns may alternatively be
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addressed by exploiting well-defined natural experiments, but such experiments typically
restrict analysis to specific historical episodes. In contrast, my approach allows me to
study a more general setting, covering 50 years of US experience.
The magnitude of the crowding out effect is certainly puzzling. First, it is surprising
that population should adjust fully to labor supply shocks within one decade, given the
response to demand shocks is somewhat sluggish. And second, I find small but significant
effects of foreign inflows on local employment rates3: despite one-for-one crowding out,
the evidence does not point to full adjustment. How can this be interpreted? An “excess”
internal response to foreign inflows may be driven by natives’ distaste for migrant enclaves,
but this should put upward pressure on local employment rates - and I find the opposite.
Alternatively, it may be that migrants are more productive than natives (in the sense of
doing the same work for less), so local adjustment may be incomplete even under one-for-
one crowd-out. And finally, the crowding effect may be overstated due to undercoverage
of unauthorized migrants in the census.
Other studies have also identified substantial geographical crowd-out (e.g. Filer, 1992;
Frey, 1995; 1996; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Hatton and Tani, 2005; Borjas, 2006),
though Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri (2016) have disputed Borjas’ (2006)
methodology. Monras (2015b) identifies a one-for-one effect following the short run surge
of Mexican migrants during the Peso crisis of 1995, but he finds much less crowding out
over longer horizons. In complementary work, Burstein et al. (2018) show that migrants
crowd out natives from employment in migrant-intensive non-tradable jobs, but this is
specifically a within-CZ effect. Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) find that Czech
workers who were permitted to commute across the German border in the early 1990s
crowded out German residents one-for-one in local employment. The bulk of the effect
(about two thirds) materializes in local non-employment rather than population, though
this decomposition only relates to a three year horizon.
Still, the US literature has more typically gravitated to small negative or even pos-
itive effects on native population. See, for example, Butcher and Card (1991), Wright,
Ellis and Reibel (1997), Card and DiNardo (2000), Card (2001, 2005, 2009a), Card and
Lewis (2007), Cortes (2008), Boustan, Fishback and Kantor (2010), Wozniak and Murray
(2012), Hong and McLaren (2015), Edo and Rapoport (2017) and Piyapromdee (2017);
see Pischke and Velling (1997) for similar results for Germany, and Sanchis-Guarner
(2014) for Spain; and see Peri and Sparber (2011) and Lewis and Peri (2014) for recent
surveys. There are various possible theoretical explanations. One is that native-born
workers are relatively immobile geographically (Cadena and Kovak, 2016). Alternatively,
labor demand may adjust endogenously to foreign migration, whether through produc-
tion technology or migrants’ consumption: see Lewis (2011), Dustmann and Glitz (2015)
and Hong and McLaren (2015). And third, migrants and natives may be imperfect sub-
3See also Smith (2012), Edo and Rapoport (2017) and Gould (forthcoming).
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stitutes in production: see Card (2009b); Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012);
Ottaviano and Peri (2012). For example, Peri and Sparber (2009), D’Amuri and Peri
(2014) and Foged and Peri (2016) argue that natives have a comparative advantage in
communication-intensive tasks.
In the final part of the paper, I attempt to reconcile my crowding out results with the
existing literature. The seminal work has typically addressed the challenge of omitted
local effects by exploiting variation across skill groups within geographical areas (e.g.
Card and DiNardo, 2000; Card, 2001, 2005; Borjas, 2006; Cortes, 2008; Monras, 2015b).
That is, they study the effect of skill-specific foreign inflows on local skill composition.
But small composition effects are not necessarily inconsistent with large geographical
crowd-out - for two reasons. First, these effects reflect not only differential internal
mobility, but also changes in the characteristics of local birth cohorts. Indeed, I find that
cohort effects have historically offset the impact of geographical crowd-out. And second,
as Card (2001) and Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2016) point out, within-area
estimates do not account for the impact that new migrants exert outside their own skill
group - the importance of which depends on elasticities of substitution. This can be seen
in the sensitivity of my within-area estimates to the delineation of skill groups.
I set out my model in the following section, and Section 3 describes the data. I present
estimates of the population response to local employment shocks in Section 4, but I find
little evidence of local heterogeneity along the support of the migrant shift-share. This
is suggestive of crowding out effects, and I test for these more explicitly in Section 5
- exploiting the shift-share as an instrument. Finally, Section 6 offers estimates which
exploit variation within areas, based on a modified version of the model.
2 Model of local population adjustment
2.1 Local equilibrium conditional on population
I base my model on Amior and Manning (2018), but now distinguish between the con-
tributions of foreign and internal migration to population adjustment. The model has
two components: first, a characterization of local equilibrium conditional on population
(based on the classic Rosen-Roback framework); and second, dynamic equations describ-
ing how population flows to higher-utility areas. Once I have set out the model, I derive
the effect of a larger foreign supply of migrants on population adjustment. And I also
show how the question can be explicitly reformulated in terms of crowding out.
To ease the exposition, I make no distinction between the labor supplied by natives
and migrants in production. Of course, to the extent that they are imperfect substitutes,
the model will then overstate any impact of foreign migration on native outcomes. But in
line with the methodology of Beaudry, Green and Sand (2012), I do not impose any such
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theoretical restrictions in the empirical estimation. Instead, I use various instruments to
identify the relationships described in the model, and I test the validity of the assumptions
ex post. As it happens, in the data, both foreign inflows and employment shocks have
remarkably similar effects on the (composition-adjusted) employment rates of natives and
migrants. Together with the large crowding out effects, this suggests there may be no
great loss from these assumptions in practice. In a similar spirit, I do not account for
skill distinctions here, but see Appendix A.6 for an exposition which does.
There are two goods: a traded good, priced at P everywhere; and a non-traded good
(housing), priced at P hr in area r. Assuming homothetic preferences, one can derive a
unique local price index:
Pr = Q
(
P, P hr
)
(1)
Let Nr and Lr be employment and population respectively in area r, and suppose all
employed individuals earn a wage Wr. The standard Rosen-Roback model assumes labor
supply is fixed, so there is no meaningful difference between employment and population.
But I allow labor supply to be somewhat elastic to the real consumption wage:
nr = lr + ǫ
s (wr − pr) + z
s
r (2)
where lower case variables denote logs, and zsr is a local supply shifter. Labor demand is
given by:
nr = −ǫ
d (wr − p) + z
d
r (3)
where zdr is a local demand shifter. Using (2) and (3), I can solve for employment in terms
of population and local prices. And a specification for housing supply and demand (see
e.g. Appendix A.4) is then sufficient to solve for all the endogenous variables in terms of
population lr alone.
I write indirect utility in area r as a function of the real consumption wage wr − pr
and local amenities ar:
vr = wr − pr + ar (4)
Crucially, the real wage can be replaced using the labor supply curve (2). And the
employment rate can then serve as a sufficient statistic for local labor market conditions:
vr =
1
ǫs
(nr − lr − z
s
r) + ar (5)
This result is fundamental to the analysis which follows. In practice, this interpretation of
the local employment rate may be compromised by heterogeneous preferences for leisure.
But as I argue in Section 3.2, this may be addressed by adjusting local employment
rates for demographic composition. Another possible concern is heterogeneity in the
price index: in particular, Albert and Monras (2018) argue that migrants place less
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weight on local (and more weight on foreign) prices. But this should not affect the
validity of the sufficient statistic result.4 Beyond this, Amior and Manning (2018) show
the result is robust to numerous possible extensions: multiple traded and non-traded
sectors5, agglomeration effects, endogenous amenities and frictional labor markets.
2.2 Local dynamics
In the long run, the model is closed with a spatial arbitrage condition which imposes that
vr is invariant geographically. This determines the steady-state population lr in each area.
But I allow for dynamic adjustment to this steady-state, with population responding
sluggishly to local utility differentials. And I distinguish between the contributions of
internal and foreign migration to these population changes:
dlr = λ
I
r + λ
F
r (6)
where λIr is the instantaneous rate of net internal inflows (i.e. from within the US) to
area r, and λFr is the rate of foreign inflows, relative to local population. I do not account
for emigration here, but I return to this point when discussing the data.
I assume λIr and λ
F
r are increasing linearly in local utility vr. The former is given by:
λIr = γ
I (nr − lr − z
s
r + ar) (7)
where γI ≥ 0 represents the speed of adjustment. I have abstracted from a national-
level intercept in this expression, but one might redefine the amenity effect ar to include
one. Agents in (7) are implicitly myopic: their behavior depends only on current condi-
tions. But as Amior and Manning (2018) show, one can write an equivalent equation for
forward-looking agents, where the elasticity γI depends both on workers’ mobility and
the persistence of local shocks. In such an environment, it is not possible to ascribe a
structural interpretation to γI , but this is not my intent. Turning now to foreign inflows:
λFr − µr
µr
= γF (nr − lr − z
s
r + ar) (8)
where µr is the local “migrant intensity”, the foreign inflow rate in the absence of local
utility differentials.6 Importantly, I permit µr to vary across areas r: intuitively, absorp-
4Suppose natives and migrants face different price indices in a given area r. The labor supply functions
of natives and migrants will then depend on their respective indices. And so, the real consumption wage
in both natives’ and migrants’ indirect utility can still be replaced by the employment rate, at least after
adjusting it for demographic composition.
5Hong and McLaren (2015) emphasize that migrants support local labor demand through consump-
tion. Within my framework, such effects are observationally equivalent to a flatter labor demand curve.
6Notice that γF in (8) is the elasticity of the flow from abroad, while γI in (7) is the elasticity of the
stock of existing local residents. But as I show in Appendix A.1, γI can also be expressed in terms of
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tion into the US may entail fixed costs (due to job market access, language or culture), and
these entry costs may be lower in some areas than others. Once migrants have entered the
US (and paid any fixed costs), I assume they behave identically to natives. In practice,
Appendix C shows the newest migrants do make more internal long-distance moves than
natives, but the differential is eliminated within five years of entry. One might alterna-
tively account for differential foreign inflows by incorporating migrant-specific amenities
(with implications for utility), but this would complicate the exposition without adding
significant insight - at least for the questions I am studying.
Summing (7) and (8), aggregate population growth can then be written as:
dlr = µr + γr (nr − lr − z
s
r + ar) (9)
where
γr ≡ γ
I + γFµr (10)
is the (heterogeneous) aggregate population elasticity in area r.
2.3 Discrete-time specification
To estimate the population response in (9), I need a discrete-time expression. Assuming
the supply effect zsr , amenity effect ar and employment nr change at a constant rate within
each discrete interval, and assuming also that local migrant intensity µr is constant within
intervals, I show in Appendix A.2 that (9) can be written as:
∆lrt = µrt +
(
1−
1− e−γrt
γrt
)
(∆nrt − µrt −∆z
sa
rt ) +
(
1− e−γrt
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
(11)
where zsart ≡ z
s
rt − art represents the combined supply and amenity effects at time t, µrt
denotes the migrant intensity between t − 1 and t, and γrt is the aggregate population
elasticity in the same interval.
Equation (11) is an error correction model in population and employment: the change
in local population ∆lrt depends on the change in employment ∆nrt and the lagged
employment rate (nrt−1 − lrt−1), which accounts for the initial conditions. The coefficients
on both these terms are monotonically increasing in γrt, and are bounded by 0 below
(as γrt → 0) and 1 above (as γrt → ∞). A coefficient of 1 on ∆nrt would indicate
that population adjusts fully to contemporaneous employment shocks, and a coefficient
of 1 on (nrt−1 − lrt−1) that any initial steady-state deviation is fully eliminated in the
subsequent period by population adjustment. Conversely, coefficients closer to zero would
be indicative of sluggish adjustment.
Using (7) and (8), the discrete-time population response can then be disaggregated
the elasticities of internal inflows and outflows.
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into foreign and internal contributions:
λFrt = µrt +
γFµrt
γrt
[(
1−
1− e−γrt
γrt
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt − µrt) +
(
1− e−γrt
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)]
(12)
and
λIrt =
γI
γrt
[(
1−
1− e−γrt
γrt
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt − µrt) +
(
1− e−γrt
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)]
(13)
where λFrt ≡
∫ t
t−1 λ
F
r (τ) dτ and λ
I
rt ≡
∫ t
t−1 λ
I
r (τ) dτ . See Appendix A.2 for derivations.
2.4 Response to migrant intensity, µrt
The supply of foreign migrants, µrt, exerts two distinct effects on local population. First,
a direct effect: µrt enters the foreign inflow one-for-one in (12), though there is a com-
pensating reduction of population growth equal to
(
1− 1−e
−γrt
γrt
)
µrt < µrt. This comes
through partial crowd-out of both the foreign and internal contributions, as the larger
supply of migrants puts downward pressure on the local employment rate.
But there is also an indirect effect: through changes in the aggregate population
elasticity, γrt. This modifies the response of λ
F
rt and λ
I
rt to local employment shocks, and
it is this mechanism which motivates the paper. To see it more clearly, it is useful to take
a linear approximation around µrt = 0. As I show in Appendix A.3, this yields:
λFrt ≈ µrt +
γFµrt
γI
[(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt ) +
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)]
(14)
and
λIrt ≈
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt − µrt) +
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nt−1 − lt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
(15)
−
γFµrt
γI
(
1− 2
1− e−γ
I
γI
+ e−γ
I
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt )
−
γFµrt
γI
(
1− e−γ
I
− γIe−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
As the bracketed term of (14) shows, a larger supply of foreign migrants µrt makes
foreign inflows λFrt more responsive to local employment shocks. However, (15) shows
that a larger µrt also moderates the internal response: both
(
1− 21−e
−γI
γI
+ e−γ
I
)
and(
1− e−γ
I
− γIe−γ
I
)
exceed zero for γI > 0. Intuitively, the larger foreign contribution
makes the local employment rate (and therefore utility) less sensitive to employment
shocks; and narrower utility differentials discourage workers from moving internally, along
the path of adjustment.7
7There is no crowding out of the foreign response in equation (14), but this is an artificial consequence
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Summing (14) and (15) gives the (approximate) aggregate population response:
∆lrt ≈
1− e−γ
I
γI
µrt +
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt ) +
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
+γFµrt
[
1
γI
(
1− e−γ
I
γI
− e−γ
I
)
(∆nrt −∆z
sa
rt ) + e
−γI
(
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)]
(16)
All the coefficients on the µrt terms in this equation exceed zero. In words, as migrant intensity
µrt expands, population grows more (i.e. the direct effect) and becomes more responsive
to local employment shocks (the indirect effect). However, crucially, the coefficients on the
µrt terms are also monotonically decreasing in the elasticity of the (offsetting) internal
response, γI ; and they all go to zero as γI → ∞. Intuitively, foreign migration does not
“grease the wheels” if the wheels are already greased.
2.5 “Semi-structural” specification for crowding out
The “direct” and “indirect” effects of µrt are both manifestations of geographical crowd-
out. But this can be addressed more explicitly by asking: what is the effect of realized
foreign inflows λFrt on net internal inflows λ
I
rt? This question identifies the same crowding
out effect because of the exclusion restriction embedded in (7) and (8): i.e. that µrt
enters the system exclusively through λFrt. In exploiting this restriction, this approach
may be interpreted as “semi-structural”; while conversely, (14)-(16) are “reduced form”
in that they collapse the impact of foreign inflows to the original µrt shock. To derive a
semi-structural specification, I first write a new expression for the instantaneous change
in log population (in place of (9)), but this time taking the foreign contribution λFr as
given:
dlr = λ
F
r + γ
I (nr − lr − z
sa
r ) (17)
This defines the evolution of the local employment rate. And given this, as I show in
Appendix A.5, I can derive the discrete-time internal contribution λIrt:
λIrt =
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)(
∆nrt − λ
F
rt −∆z
sa
rt
)
+
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
(18)
In contrast to (15), migrant intensity µrt does not appear: its effect is fully summarized by
λFrt. Given the initial conditions (encapsulated by the lagged employment rate and z
sa
rt−1),
the effect of λFrt expands monotonically from 0 to -1, as the internal response becomes
perfectly elastic (γI → ∞). Notice the coefficients on ∆nrt and λ
F
rt are identical (up
to their sign): this yields an overidentifying restriction which I exploit in the empirical
analysis. Intuitively, these effects represent the pure mobility response to an equal change
in local utility, as summarized by the local employment rate.
of linearizing around µrt = 0.
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However, the coefficient on λFrt in (18) is not a “true” crowding out effect: it conditions
on employment growth ∆nrt, which may itself be an important margin of adjustment.
To derive an “unconditional” effect, it is necessary to reduce ∆nrt to its exogenous com-
ponents. This requires a specification of the housing market, as local prices shift labor
supply (2) but not demand (3). Assuming individuals spend a fixed share of their income
on housing (i.e. Cobb-Douglas utility) and abstracting from non-labor income, Appendix
A.4 shows that changes in local prices pr can be specified as:
∆ (prt − pt) =
1
κ
[
1
ǫs
(∆nrt −∆lrt −∆z
s
rt) + ∆nrt
]
(19)
where κ > 0 and goes to infinity with the elasticity of housing supply.8 In Appendix A.5,
I then show that eliminating ∆nrt from (18) and replacing z
sa
r with z
s
r−ar (the individual
labor supply and amenity effects) yields:
λIrt =
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
η
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
η
(
κ
κ+ ǫd
∆zdrt − λ
F
rt −∆z
s
rt +
1
η
∆art
)
(20)
+
γI
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
η
(
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
s
rt−1 + art−1
)
where
η ≡
(
1 +
κ + 1
κ+ ǫd
·
ǫd
ǫs
)
−1
< 1 (21)
As before, the crowding out effect of λFrt goes to -1 as internal flows become perfectly
elastic (γI → ∞). But given I am no longer conditioning on current employment, the
impact of λFrt is now moderated by an expansion of local labor demand - and potentially
also of housing supply. To see this, notice the effect of λFrt in (20) is identical to (18) for
η = 1, and it becomes smaller as η declines. Looking at (21), as the elasticity of labor
demand ǫd grows relative to the supply elasticity ǫs, η converges to zero: in the limit,
adjustment is fully manifested in changes in local employment rather than population
(i.e. no crowding out). The effect of the housing supply elasticity (represented by κ),
though, is theoretically ambiguous.9
To the extent that crowding out is incomplete (i.e. less than one-for-one), the model
predicts that foreign inflows should reduce the local employment rate. This offers another
8Specifically, κ ≡
1−ν+ǫhs
r
ν
, where ν is the (fixed) share of income spent on housing, and ǫhsr is the
housing supply elasticity.
9η (and therefore the crowding out effect) are decreasing in κ (and hence in the elasticity of housing
supply) if and only if εd > 1. This condition ensures that the local wage bill (and therefore housing
demand) expands in the face of foreign inflows.
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overidentifying restriction which I test below. As I show in Appendix A.5:
∆(nrt − lrt − z
s
rt) =
η
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
η
[
κ
κ+ ǫd
∆zdrt − λ
F
rt −∆z
s
rt −
(
γI
1− e−γI
− 1
)
∆art
]
−
γIη
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
η
(
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
s
rt−1 + art−1
)
(22)
Notice the impact of foreign inflows λFrt goes to zero as γ
I increases.
Finally, crowding out in the model is driven entirely by the labor market impact of
immigration. But natives’ amenity valuations (which I have taken as given) may also play
a role. Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012) show that hostility to immigration (at least
in Europe) is largely motivated by concern over the composition of neighbors rather than
the labor market. Having said that, this should not necessarily trigger sorting across CZs:
natives can also escape migrant communities by switching neighborhoods within CZs (see
e.g. Saiz andWachter, 2011, on neighborhood segregation). In the context of the crowding
out equations (18) and (20), a disamenity effect is observationally equivalent to a negative
correlation between the foreign inflow λFrt and the amenity change ∆art. Interestingly,
given the negative coefficient on ∆art in (22), this would imply a less negative (or even
positive) effect of foreign inflows on the local employment rate - as native flight would
tighten the labor market. I exploit this prediction below.
3 Data
3.1 Population
I use decadal census data on individuals aged 16-64 across 722 Commuting Zones (CZs)
in the Continental US over 1960-2010.10 The model disaggregates the change in log local
population ∆lrt into contributions from foreign and internal migration, i.e. λ
F
rt and λ
I
rt.
However, since I only observe population at discrete intervals, I cannot precisely identify
λFrt and λ
I
rt in the data - though I can offer an approximation. Let L
F
rt be the foreign-born
population in area r and time t who arrived in the US in the previous ten years (i.e.
since t− 1). The total population change ∆Lrt may then be disaggregated into L
F
rt and
10CZs were originally developed as an approximation to local labor markets by Tolbert and Sizer
(1996), based on county groups, and recently popularized by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn
and Hanson (2013). Where possible, I base my data on published county-level aggregates from the US
census, extracted from the National Historical Geographic Information System (Manson et al., 2017).
Where necessary, I supplement this with information from microdata census extracts and (for the 2010
cross-section) American Community Survey samples of 2009-11, taken from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2017). This follows the approach of Amior and Manning (2018); see
Appendix B.1 for further details on data construction. I begin the analysis in 1960 because of data
limitations: I do not observe migrants’ year of arrival in 1960, so I cannot identify the contribution of
new foreign migrants to local population in the 1950s.
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a residual, ∆Lrt − L
F
rt. And the log change can be written as:
∆lrt ≡ log
(
Lrt
Lrt−1
)
≡ log
(
Lrt−1 + L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
+ log
(
Lrt − L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
− log
(
1 +
LFrt
Lrt
·
∆Lrt − L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
(23)
Given this, I approximate λFrt and λ
I
rt with λˆ
F
rt and λˆ
I
rt respectively, where:
λˆFrt ≡ log
(
Lrt−1 + L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
(24)
λˆIrt ≡ log
(
Lrt − L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
(25)
which leaves the final term of (23) as the approximation error. One might alternatively
take first order approximations, i.e. λFrt ≈
LFrt
Lrt−1
and λIrt ≈
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
. These converge to
λFrt and λ
I
rt as they individually become small. However, convergence in the case of (24)
and (25) merely requires that the product
LFrt
Lrt
·
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
becomes small.
Of course, the residual contribution λˆIrt does not just consist of internal flows. It covers
the entire contribution of natives and “old” migrants (i.e. those who arrived in the US
before t− 1), part of which is “natural” growth and emigration from the US. Emigration
is presumably more relevant for the foreign-born (consider e.g. return migration), so it
is useful to additionally study the component of λˆIrt which is driven by natives alone:
λˆ
I,N
rt ≡ log
(
Lrt−1 +∆L
N
rt
Lrt−1
)
(26)
where LNrt is the local stock of natives at time t.
An important concern in constructing λˆFrt is undercoverage of unauthorized migrants
in the data. Surprisingly perhaps, many unauthorized migrants do respond to the census
(Warren and Passel, 1987), but a significant fraction do not. The US Department of
Homeland Security (2003) estimates that almost half the migrants who entered the US
in the 1990s did not have legal status, and that the census understated the total 1990s
foreign inflow by about 7 percent. The undercount was more severe in earlier years: see
Card and Lewis (2007). For example, Marcelli and Ong (2002) find that 10-15 percent
of unauthorized Mexicans were missed by the 2000 census; Van Hook and Bean (1998)
estimate that 30 percent were missed in 1990; and Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991)
estimate an undercount of 40 percent in 1980. Any such undercoverage will cause me to
underestimate the true foreign contribution to local labor market adjustment, and also
to overstate the extent of geographical crowd-out.
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3.2 Employment
One contribution of this paper beyond Amior and Manning (2018) is to adjust the em-
ployment variables for local demographics. I have shown above how the employment rate
can serve as a sufficient statistic for local economic opportunity. But if different worker
types have different propensities to work (for given labor prices), the employment rate
will be conflated with variation in local demographic composition. Though the model
does not explicitly account for such heterogeneity, these compositional effects may be
represented by variation in the local supply shifter zsr . This variation is not a problem if
the instruments (Bartik shift-shares) can exclude it. But the exclusion restriction will be
violated if demographic groups with higher employment rates (such as the high educated
or foreign-born men11) also differ systematically in geographical mobility.
My strategy is to construct an employment rate variable, denoted E˜Rrt, which adjusts
for local demographic composition. To this end, I run probit regressions of employment
on a detailed range of individual characteristics12 and a set of location fixed effects, sep-
arately for each census cross-section. I then compute E˜Rrt by taking the mean predicted
employment rate in each area r for a distribution of local demographic characteristics
identical to the full national sample:
E˜Rrt =
∫
i
Ω
(
Xitθˆt + θˆrt
)
g (Xit) di (27)
where Ω is the normal c.d.f., θˆt is the vector of estimated probit coefficients on the
individual characteristics, θˆrt are the probit area fixed effects, and g (Xit) is the national-
level density of individuals with characteristics Xit at time t.
What are the implications for the estimating equation? Notice the log of the composition-
adjusted rate (at some unspecified time) can be written as:
log E˜Rr ≡ nr − lr − z˜
s
r (28)
where z˜sr is the component of the supply shifter z
s
r attributable to observable local de-
mographic composition. I can then define n˜r as the composition-adjusted level of log
employment:
n˜r ≡ nr − z˜
s
r ≡ log E˜Rr + lr (29)
and the instantaneous population response dlr in (9) can be rewritten as:
dlr = µr + γr [n˜r − lr − (z
s
r − z˜
s
r) + ar] (30)
11See Borjas (2016) on the latter.
12Age, age squared, education (five categories), ethnicity (black, Asian, Hispanic), gender, foreign-
born status, and where available, years in US and its square for migrants, together with a rich set of
interactions. See Appendix B.2.
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where (zsr − z˜
s
r) is the residual component of the local supply shifter (which cannot be
attributed to local composition). In discrete time, by symmetry with (11), local popula-
tion changes ∆lrt will then depend on (i) the current change in the composition-adjusted
employment level, ∆n˜rt ≡ ∆ log E˜Rrt+∆lrt, and (ii) the lagged log composition-adjusted
rate (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) ≡ log E˜Rrt−1. The identifying conditions are now weaker: conditional
on the right hand side controls, the Bartik instruments need only exclude the residual
supply effect (zsr − z˜
s
r) and any unobserved amenities in ar.
3.3 Shift-share instruments
I identify changes in local demand using the pervasive Bartik (1991) industry shift-share,
which I denote brt. The intention is to exclude unobserved supply and amenity effects
in zsr and ar. The Bartik predicts local employment growth, conditional on initial indus-
trial composition, by assuming employment in each industry i grows at the average rate
elsewhere in the country:
brt =
∑
i
φirt−1∆ni(−r)t (31)
where φirt−1 is the share of workers in area r at time t− 1 employed in a 2-digit industry
i; and ∆ni(−r)t is the change in log employment nationally in industry i, excluding area
r.13 I instrument the current employment growth ∆n˜rt and the lagged employment
rate (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) using the current and lagged Bartiks (brt and brt−1) respectively. In
principle, the lagged employment rate will depend on a distributed lag of historical shocks,
but I find the first lag alone has sufficient power for the first stage.
Similarly, I proxy local migrant intensity µrt with a migrant shift-share, popularized
by Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001). New migrants are known to cluster around
established co-patriot communities, whether because of family ties, job networks (Munshi,
2003) or cultural amenities (Gonzalez, 1998). The shift-share predicts the supply of
new migrants to each area r by allocating new arrivals proportionately to the size of
these communities. To express this predicted supply (which I denote µˆrt) in terms of its
contribution to the log population change ∆lrt, I use an identical functional form to (24):
µˆrt = log
(
Lt−1 +
∑
o φ
o
rt−1L
F
o(−r)t
Lrt−1
)
(32)
where
∑
o φ
o
rt−1L
F
o(−r)t is the predicted number of new arrivals: φ
o
rt−1 is the share of origin
country o migrants who live in area r at time t − 1, and LFo(−r)t is the number of new
origin o migrants (again excluding area r residents) who arrived in the US between t− 1
and t. This is expressed relative to the initial aggregate local population, Lrt−1. In the
13This exclusion, recommended by Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2018), was proposed by
Autor and Duggan (2003) to address concerns about endogeneity to local supply shocks.
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“semi-structural” specification (20), µˆrt serves as an instrument for foreign inflows λˆ
F
rt: it
should in principle exclude unobserved components of zsr , ar and also demand shocks z
d
r .
I construct both the Bartik and migrant shift-shares using census and American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) microdata: see Appendix B.3 for further details.
3.4 Amenity controls
I control for a range of observable amenity effects in my empirical specifications, iden-
tical to those in Amior and Manning (2018). These consist of (i) a binary indicator for
the presence of coastline14 (ocean or Great Lakes); (ii) climate indicators, specifically
maximum January temperature, maximum July temperature and mean July relative hu-
midity (Rappaport, 2007, shows that Americans have been moving to places with more
pleasant weather); (iii) log population density in 1900; and (iv) an index of CZ isola-
tion, specifically the log distance to the closest CZ, where distance is measured between
population-weighted centroids in 1990. Because the impact of some of these might vary
over time (see Rappaport and Sachs, 2003; Rappaport, 2007), I interact each of them
with a full set of year effects in the regressions below.
I do not control for time-varying amenities which may be endogenous to labor mar-
ket conditions, such as crime and local restaurants, since these present challenges for
identification. This means the estimated coefficients on the employment shocks should
be interpreted as “reduced form” effects, accounting for both their direct (labor market)
effect on population and any indirect effects driven by changes in local amenity values
(see Diamond, 2016).
4 Population response to local employment shocks
4.1 Average contribution of foreign migration
I begin by studying the average contribution of foreign migration to local population
adjustment, initially abstracting away from heterogeneity in the local migrant intensity
µrt. In line with equation (11), I implement the following error correction model:
∆lrt = β0 + β1∆n˜rt + β2 (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + ArtβA + εrt (33)
where t denotes time periods at decadal intervals, and ∆ is a decadal change. I regress
the change in log population ∆lrt on the the change in log (composition-adjusted) em-
ployment ∆n˜rt and the lagged (composition-adjusted) employment rate (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1),
i.e. the initial deviation from steady-state. The vector Art contains observable compo-
nents (amenity effects) from the ∆zsart and z
sa
rt−1 terms in (11), as well as a full set of time
14The coastline data was borrowed from Rappaport and Sachs (2003).
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effects. The error εrt includes any unobserved supply or amenity effects. All observations
are weighted by the lagged local population share, and standard errors are clustered by
state.15 It should be emphasized that (33) is misspecified, in the sense that it neglects
the dependence of the β parameters on local migrant intensity.
I set out estimates of β1 and β2 in Panel A of Table 1. The OLS responses of the
aggregate population ∆lrt are 0.86 and 0.25 respectively (column 1). These cannot be
interpreted causally: unobserved supply shocks will bias OLS estimates of β1 upwards;
and β2 estimates may be biased downwards if these shocks are persistent. For example,
a positive supply shock should raise local population growth but reduce the employment
rate. To address these concerns, I instrument the two endogenous variables with the
current and lagged Bartiks. I set out the first stage estimates in columns 1-2 of Table 2. I
have marked in bold where one should theoretically expect positive effects. As one might
hope, the current Bartik accounts for the entire effect on ∆n˜rt, and the lagged Bartik
for the effect on (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1), with large associated Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) F-
statistics (which account for multiple endogenous variables). The IV estimates of β1
and β2 in column 5 are 0.75 and 0.55 respectively (and the associated standard errors
are small), so the OLS bias is in the expected direction. These numbers indicate large
but incomplete population adjustment over one decade to contemporaneous employment
shocks and initial conditions. Interestingly, they are somewhat larger than estimates
based on raw (i.e. non-adjusted) employment variables: see Appendix D.1.16
Columns 2 and 6 replace the dependent variable with the approximate foreign contri-
bution λˆFrt (as defined in Section 3.1), and columns 3 and 7 with the residual contribution
λˆIrt. The approximation appears reasonable: for IV, the β1 estimates in columns 6 and 7
sum to 0.76, and the β2 estimates to 0.58 - very close to the column 5 estimates. Again
looking at IV, new migrants account for 32 percent of the overall population response to
contemporaneous shocks (β1), and remarkably, 57 percent of the response to the lagged
employment rate (β2) - despite accounting for just 4 percent of the population on av-
erage.17 To the extent that new migrants are under-reported in the census, the true
15In line with Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), CZs which straddle state lines are allocated to the
state which accounts for the largest population share. This leaves me with 48 states: Alaska and Hawaii
are excluded from the sample, and the Washington CZ is allocated to Maryland.
16Appendix D.1 places these at 0.63 and 0.39 for β1 and β2 respectively. The difference is intuitive.
For example, the college educated population is known to respond more strongly (see e.g. Amior and
Manning, 2018), but these individuals also have higher employment rates. As a result, the raw change
in total employment (the right hand side variable) should exceed the change for individuals of fixed
characteristics - so estimates based on raw employment should understate the population response.
17As one might expect, the average foreign contribution is smaller once I omit population weights
(see Appendix D.3): this is because new migrants typically cluster in larger CZs. This speaks to the
misspecification of (33): it does not account for local heterogeneity. In Appendix D.4, I break down
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contribution may be even larger. The numbers are much smaller for OLS however: 6 and
36 percent respectively. I also report the contribution of natives alone, i.e. λˆI,Nrt from
(26). The IV estimates are very similar to column 7, which suggests old migrants (i.e.
those already living in the US in t − 1) contribute little to the response to employment
shocks: it appears emigration does not play an important role.
In Panel B, I control additionally for the local migrant shift-share µˆrt (which proxies
for migrant intensity), as defined in (32). There are two key messages here. First, the
inclusion of µˆrt wipes away about half the foreign response to local employment shocks
(column 6). Thus, the large contribution of new migrants to local adjustment is partly
explained by their preference to settle in co-patriot communities - which happen to be
disproportionately located in high-employment areas. This should come as no surprise:
the coincidence of migrant enclaves with high employment is a natural consequence of
the persistence of local demand shocks.
On the other hand, the overall population response is unaffected (column 5): holding
µˆrt fixed, the now smaller foreign contribution to adjustment is offset by a larger residual
contribution (column 7). This speaks to the “indirect” effect of migrant intensity µrt (on
the response to local shocks) discussed above, and I address this more explicitly in what
follows. Notice also that µˆrt elicits a clear “direct” effect: a one-for-one increase in the
foreign contribution (column 6), offset by a similar decline in the residual (column 7).
4.2 Local heterogeneity
Exploiting variation in the migrant shift-share µˆrt across space and time, I now study
heterogeneity in the local population response. In line with (16), I estimate:
∆lrt = β
c
0 + β
c
1∆n˜rt + β
c
2 (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + Artβ
c
A (34)
+
[
βc0µ + β
c
1µ∆n˜rt + β
c
2µ (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + Artβ
c
Aµ
]
µˆrt + εrt
where µˆrt is now interacted with the change in log employment ∆n˜rt, the lagged em-
ployment rate (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) and the amenity effects in Art. I have introduced two new
endogenous variables, so I need two additional instruments: I use interactions between
migrant intensity µˆrt and the current and lagged Bartiks. The first stage estimates are
reported in columns 5-8 of Table 2. Each instrument has a strong positive effect (with a
small standard error) on its corresponding endogenous variable - as marked in bold.
Table 3 reports OLS and IV estimates of (34). It is useful to begin with columns 2 and
6, where I replace the dependent variable with the foreign contribution λˆFrt. Consistent
the foreign contribution by country or region of origin, but the response is not dominated by particular
origins.
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with (14) in the model, the interactions pick up the entire effect of employment shocks:
i.e. employment growth attracts no foreign inflows in CZs with µˆrt = 0. In OLS, the
responses to both ∆n˜rt and (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) increase to about 0.2 at µˆrt = 0.1, which is the
98th percentile of µˆrt (the maximum value is 0.29: the distribution is heavily skewed).
And in IV, they increase to a remarkable 0.49 and 0.74 respectively at µˆrt = 0.1.
As the model predicts, these larger foreign contributions are offset by reduced residual
contributions. The story is mixed in OLS, but the patterns are much starker for IV: in
areas better supplied by new migrants, aggregate population growth is not significantly
larger nor more responsive to employment shocks (column 5). This entails a substantial
reduction in the residual contribution (column 7): moving from µˆrt = 0 to µˆrt = 0.1, it
declines from 0.81 to 0.28 for the ∆n˜rt response, and from 0.60 to -0.06 for (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1).
And at least for IV, the residual contribution also fully offsets the “direct” effect of µˆrt
(i.e. independent of the employment shocks) on local population. Having said that, it is
worth stressing that the estimates do also admit the possibility of incomplete crowding
out: the standard errors on the offsetting residual response (column 7) are close to half
the magnitude of the βc0µ and β
c
2µ coefficients (though it is smaller for β
c
1µ).
Columns 4 and 8 report the contribution of natives alone. The interaction effects in
all specifications exceed those in columns 3 and 7, implying that old migrants amplify
the contribution of new migrants to adjustment - while natives account for the entire
crowding out effect. The impact of old migrants is intuitive: they disproportionately
reside in areas with large migrant shift-shares µˆrt, so they should mechanically contribute
more to population adjustment in these places.
Appendix D subjects the IV estimates in Tables 1 and 3 to a range of robustness
tests. First, in an effort to account for unobserved time-invariant amenity or supply
effects, I control for CZ fixed effects (which pick up local population trends). This is a
demanding test in such a short panel, but the crowding out patterns are unaffected. They
are also robust to dropping the dynamic term (the lagged employment rate) and using
raw (instead of composition-adjusted) employment variables. This latter result should be
reassuring: since adjusting local employment for observable characteristics makes little
difference to the results, one may be less concerned about the influence of unobservables.
Omitting the amenity-µˆrt interacted controls makes little difference to the coefficients,
but the standard errors do become much larger. One may be concerned that the crowding
out effects are driven by outliers with very large µˆrt (given the skew in this variable), but
dropping observations with µˆrt > 0.1 makes little difference. And finally, for CZs whose
population exceeded 50,000 in 1960, the crowding out result is also robust to removing
the population weights.
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4.3 Evolution of local employment rates
Importantly, the model treats natives and migrants as perfect substitutes. The large
crowding out effects indicated by Table 3 suggest there may be no great loss from this
assumption - at least at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, one may be concerned that the
local demand shocks (and the population responses to these shocks) affect natives and
migrants differently. As it happens though, I find no significant difference in the effect
on their respective employment rates.
In Table 4, I re-estimate (33) and (34) using the same instruments as before, but
replacing the dependent variable with changes in log (composition-adjusted) employment
rates: first, the aggregate rate ∆ (n˜rt − lrt); and then the native and migrant-specific
rates. The latter two are adjusted using the same procedure outlined in Section 3.2, but
with the sample restricted to natives or migrants.18 Notice the column 1 estimates are
merely transformations of those in column 5 of Table 1: the coefficient on the employment
change is equal to 1− β1 in (33), while the coefficient on the lagged employment rate is
simply −β2. In words, a larger population response to an employment shock implies a
smaller employment rate effect. But importantly, the responses of the native and migrant
employment rates in columns 2 and 3 are similar in magnitude.
Columns 4-6 account additionally for local heterogeneity, in line with (34). This
specification is comparable to Cadena and Kovak’s (2016) tests for the “employment
smoothing” effects of Mexican enclaves. Again, the coefficients in column 4 are merely
transformations of those in column 5 of Table 3. The insignificant effects of the interac-
tions suggest that foreign migration does not smooth local fluctuations in employment
rates. And the same applies to the native and migrant employment rates individually.
5 “Semi-structural” estimates of crowding out
5.1 Estimates of crowding out
The analysis above offers a “reduced form” perspective on the impact of local migrant
intensity µrt. The results suggest it has no significant effect on the evolution of local
population or employment rates. The natural interpretation is that new migrants crowd
out the contribution of internal mobility to local population growth - both directly and
in the response to local employment shocks. But this crowding out effect can be tested
1811 small CZs in the 1960s are omitted from the migrant employment rate regressions. These CZs
do not offer a sufficient migrant sample in the microdata to deliver fixed effect estimates in the probit
regression, preventing me from computing composition-adjusted employment rates.
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more explicitly using a “semi-structural” specification, imposing that the entire effect of
µˆrt in Table 3 comes through realized foreign inflows. The question then becomes: for a
given foreign inflow, what is the net outflow? A key advantage of this approach is a much
less demanding empirical specification than (34) (with its four endogenous variables), and
this should allow for greater precision in the estimates. In line with equation (20) in the
model, I estimate the following specification:
λˆIrt = δ0 + δ1λˆ
F
rt + δ2 (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + δ3brt + ArtδA + εrt (35)
where λˆIrt and λˆ
F
rt are the approximate residual and foreign contributions, and the crowd-
ing out effect is given by δ1. The lagged employment rate is in principle a sufficient
statistic for all historical labor demand and supply shocks, including past foreign inflows.
I instrument the current foreign inflow λˆFrt with the migrant shift-share µˆrt, and the lagged
employment rate with the lagged Bartik brt−1. I include the current Bartik brt as a con-
trol to proxy for contemporaneous demand shocks, ∆zdr . Any unobserved components of
supply or demand shocks are contained in the residual εrt. Since I am not conditioning
on the contemporaneous change in employment, δ1 will depend not only on the speed of
internal population adjustment but also on the elasticities of labor demand, labor supply
and housing supply: see equation (20).
I present estimates of (35) and various deviations in columns 1-6 of Table 5 (I return
to columns 7-8 in Section 5.2). The broad message is a substantial crowding out effect,
consistent with the results in the previous section. Column 1 offers OLS estimates, with
δ1 taking a value of -0.76. That is, a foreign inflow which contributes 1 log point to local
population is associated with a net outflow (of natives or earlier migrants) which removes
0.76 points. However, omitted local shocks (which influence foreign inflows) make it
difficult to interpret the OLS estimates.
Column 2 reports IV estimates of (35), using the migrant shift-share µˆrt and lagged
Bartik brt−1 as instruments. The associated first stage regressions have substantial power
(see columns 1 and 4 of Table 6), with the right instruments explaining the right endoge-
nous variables (as marked in bold). The IV estimate is larger than OLS, with δ1 reaching
-1.1: i.e. exceeding (though insignificantly different from) one-for-one crowd-out. This
effect is precisely estimated, with a standard error of 0.13. The fact that IV exceeds OLS
is consistent with the traditional concern of unobserved demand shocks (e.g. Altonji and
Card, 1991).
One important concern is that λˆFrt may be picking up the response to both current
and historical foreign inflows (in a world with sluggish adjustment), given the tight local
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persistence in these inflows and in the migrant shift-share instrument µˆrt (Jaeger, Ruist
and Stuhler, 2018). For example, the correlation between the time-demeaned µˆrt and its
lag is 81 percent.19 In principle, the lagged employment rate should summarize the impact
of all historical shocks (including foreign inflows), and λˆIrt does respond strongly to this
variable. To test whether this “sufficient statistic” is performing its function effectively, I
now control for the lagged migrant shift-share µˆrt−1 (following Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler).
As column 5 of Table 6 shows, µˆrt−1 does adversely affect the lagged employment rate in
the first stage. But reassuringly, it has no effect conditional on the lagged employment
rate in the second stage (column 3 of Table 5). In contrast, when I drop the lagged
employment rate in column 4 (and replace it with its lagged Bartik instrument), µˆrt−1
picks up much of the negative effect. Notice also that the crowding out effect in column 4
is somewhat dented: δ1 falls from -1.1 to -0.79. One intuition is the following: the lagged
employment rate in column 3 accounts additionally for the impact of unobserved demand
shocks, which are positively correlated with the supply of new migrants.
In recent work, Peri (2016) has emphasized the importance of checking for pre-trends
when identifying the local impact of immigration. The simplest approach is to replace
the dependent variable (the residual contribution, λˆIrt) with its lag. I necessarily lose
one decade of data (the 1960s), but this does not seem to matter: compare columns 4
and 5. In column 6, the lagged λˆIrt−1 is fully explained by the lagged migrant shift-share
µˆrt−1 and Bartik brt−1. In contrast, the current foreign contribution λˆ
F
rt and Bartik brt
are statistically insignificant. This suggests I am able to empirically disentangle current
from historical shocks in this data.
But serial correlation in the enclave instrument µˆrt is by no means the only concern.
In a world with persistent shocks or sluggish adjustment, any omitted variation which
raises local utility (whether supply or demand-driven) is liable to correlate positively
with µˆrt (Pischke and Velling, 1997; Borjas, 1999). This is a natural consequence of the
large foreign contribution to local adjustment (documented in Table 1), which over time
expands migrant population shares in high-utility areas. As Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin
and Swift (2018) emphasize, it is endogeneity of these shares which threatens the validity
of shift-share instruments. To the extent this variation is unobserved, this may bias the δ1
estimate towards zero - if it simultaneously attracts inflows of new migrants and existing
US residents.
In this environment, right-hand side controls take on a crucial role. In Table 7, I study
the sensitivity of my basic IV estimate of δ1 (in column 2 in Table 5) to the choice of
controls and also decadal sample. Without any controls, the estimates vary substantially
over time: there is little crowd-out before 1990, but much more thereafter. Card (2009a)
finds something similar, and see also Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) on the instability
19This reflects a combination of stickiness in local migrant settlement patterns and national-level
persistence of foreign inflows by country of origin.
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of spatial correlations: this offers a strong motivation for pooling many decades of data.
As one might expect, the average δ1 increases (from -0.53 to -0.75) when I control for the
current Bartik and lagged employment rate (column 6). And once I include the various
amenity effects (and climate in particular), I cannot statistically reject a δ1 of at least
-1 in any decade. Interestingly, after including all the controls, δ1 is now much larger in
the 1960s and 1970s than later decades - which may reflect more severe undercoverage of
unauthorized migrants in those years. I return to this question below.
The final column of Table 7 shows about two thirds of the δ1 effect is driven by
natives rather than old migrants. But this result overlooks some important heterogeneity:
exceptionally, in the 2000s, old migrants account for the entire crowding out effect (see
Appendix E.3). This may be driven by substantial return migration of Mexicans in that
decade: see Hanson, Liu and McIntosh (2017).
Appendix E shows the crowding out effect is robust to dropping population weights
and various other specification changes. My specification of the foreign and residual
contributions is almost identical to that of Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001), as
recommended by Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri (2016). While they regress
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
on
LFrt
Lrt−1
, I am regressing log
(
Lrt−L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
on log
(
Lrt−1+LFrt
Lrt−1
)
, following the guidance
of my model.20 The appendix shows this change has a negligible effect on the δ1 estimate.
I also offer estimates based on an alternative approach recommended by Wozniak and
Murray (2012), which specifies the key variables in levels, i.e. regressing
(
∆Lrt − L
F
rt
)
on
LFrt, without normalizing by initial population. Additionally, I cannot reject one-for-one
crowding out when I control for CZ fixed effects21 (intended to pick up time-invariant
local supply or demand effects), though the estimates become less stable. The effect is
robust to basing the migrant shift-share instrument in (32) on 1960 origin shares (rather
than lagged-once shares) in all decades. Also, graphical plots of the δ1 estimates show
they are not driven by outliers. Borjas (2006) finds less crowding out across states than
metropolitan areas, but I cannot reject a δ1 of -1 using state-level data. I also show the
effect is entirely driven by reductions of migratory inflows to the affected CZs, rather than
increase in outflows. This is consistent with evidence from Coen-Pirani (2010), Monras
(2015a), Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) and Amior and Manning (2018), who
document a disproportionate role for inflows in driving local population adjustment.
20My λˆFrt specification in (24) shares with Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri (2016) the
advantage of depending only on new foreign inflows - and not on changes in the population of longer
term US residents (which might otherwise introduce a spurious correlation with λˆIrt)
21This approach is similar in spirit to the double differencing methodology of Borjas, Freeman and
Katz (1997) and is recommended by Hong and McLaren (2015).
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5.2 Why is the crowding out effect so large?
The size of the crowding out effect is certainly surprising, given the population response
to demand-driven changes in employment is somewhat sluggish (see Table 1). These
results are even harder to reconcile in the context of elastic labor demand or imperfect
substitutability between natives and migrants: both should moderate any effect of foreign
inflows on existing residents. On the other hand, as I show below, the one-for-one crowd-
ing out does not appear to bring about full adjustment. These contradictions become
more conspicuous once I control for current employment growth ∆n˜rt in the crowding
out equation (35). This yields a specification which reflects (18) in the model:
λˆIrt = δ
c
0 + δ
c
1λˆ
F
rt + δ
c
2∆n˜rt + δ
c
3 (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + Artδ
c
A + εrt (36)
The current Bartik brt is now excluded from the right hand side and serves instead as
an instrument for ∆n˜rt. δ
c
1 is a “conditional” crowding out effect: employment may
be an important margin of adjustment to foreign inflows, but its contribution is now
partialled out. Equation (18) predicts the residual contribution λˆIrt responds equally to
foreign inflows and employment shocks: i.e. δc1 = −δ
c
2. As I explain in Section 2.5, these
elasticities represent (in principle) pure mobility responses to changes in local welfare.
I report IV estimates of (36) in column 7 of Table 5 above. δc1 exceeds δ
c
2 by 0.17
in magnitude. This differential (the “excess response” to foreign inflows) is statistically
significant: the p-value on a test for equality is 0.013. Notice also the coefficient on λˆFrt
is actually smaller in column 7 (when I control for current employment) than column
2 (when I do not). Thus, any changes in local employment appear to amplify (rather
than moderate) the impact of foreign inflows. I show this more explicitly in column 8:
somewhat perversely, total employment contracts in response to foreign inflows.
Indeed, despite one-for-one crowding out, I identify small adverse effects of foreign
inflows on local employment rates - consistent with Smith (2012), Edo and Rapoport
(2017) and Gould (forthcoming). In Table 8, I re-estimate (35) using the same instru-
ments as before, but replacing the dependent with changes in the (composition-adjusted)
employment rates of natives or migrants. In my preferred specification (column 1), the
elasticity of the native employment rate to foreign inflows is -0.21. The coefficient of
-0.4 on the lagged employment rate suggests the effect is largely dissipated within two
decades. As in Table 5, the lagged migrant shift-share control µˆrt−1 in column 2 makes
little difference, which suggests the lagged employment rate is successfully accounting for
the initial conditions. Once I drop the lagged employment rate in column 3, I identify
a larger initial impact of foreign inflows (-0.35) - though the rate of adjustment implied
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by µˆrt−1 (which now takes a positive offsetting effect) is similar to before. Columns 4
and 5 (which exclude the 1960s) show what happens when I replace the dependent with
its lag. Reassuringly, as in Table 5, µˆrt−1 picks up the entire (negative) effect on the
lagged dependent, and the current inflow λˆFrt becomes insignificant. The final column
re-estimates my preferred IV specification (column 1) for the migrant employment rate:
the effect is remarkably similar to natives, consistent with the evidence in Table 4 above.
Appendix F.2 shows that using raw (instead of composition-adjusted) employment rates
makes little difference to the results: given that observable characteristics do not matter,
one may be less concerned about the influence of unobservables.
To summarize, the residual population does appear to respond “excessively” to foreign
inflows. But it also seems that one-for-one crowding out is insufficient for full adjustment.
How can these results be interpreted? One explanation is that the migrant shift-share
instrument µˆrt is negatively correlated with unobserved demand shocks. But this hypoth-
esis conflicts with the evidence in Table 1 (on the effect of the µˆrt control): there is good
reason to believe migrant enclaves are disproportionately located in high-demand areas.
An interesting variant of this hypothesis is an agglomeration effect (triggered by foreign
inflows) which favors migrants at the expense of natives. But an agglomeration story
does not sit comfortably with the apparent contraction of the local employment stock.
Alternatively, the excess response may be driven by natives’ distaste for migrant en-
claves. As I note in the discussion following equation (22), this has testable implications:
to the extent that natives leave (on net) for non-labor market reasons, this should put
upward pressure on local employment rates - or at least those of natives. But Table 8
shows the opposite effect.
A third possibility is that migrants are more productive than natives, in the sense of
doing the same work for less pay (see e.g. Nanos and Schluter, 2014; Albert, 2017; Amior,
2017b). This story is consistent with evidence of migrants downgrading in occupation
(Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler, 2016). If migrants offer more “efficiency units” than
natives, crowd-out in excess of one-for-one may be required for complete local adjustment.
And finally, the census data may be overstating the “true” crowding out effect because
of undercoverage of unauthorized migrants. For example, suppose the “true” δc1 in (36)
is equal to −δc2, and any estimated difference is due to mismeasurement. Looking at
column 7 of Table 5, this would imply the foreign inflow is understated in the census
by 0.913−0.743
0.913
= 19 per cent. This number seems reasonable in light of the evidence on
undercoverage in Section 3.1.
5.3 Education-specific effects
In Appendix F (and Table A9), I study heterogeneity in the impact of foreign inflows
across education groups. My strategy is to replace the dependent variable of (35) with
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various education-specific outcomes: population, employment rates, wages and housing
expenses. Interestingly, the results show that the foreign inflow elicited by the migrant
shift-share µˆrt resembles the existing local population in terms of college graduate share -
though high school dropouts are disproportionately represented among the new arrivals.
Still, such statistics may understate the labor market pressure on low educated natives
- to the extent that new migrants downgrade in occupation, and that undercoverage is
more severe among low educated migrants.
Indeed, the adverse effect of foreign inflows on native employment rates falls entirely on
those without college degrees. One might then expect these individuals to account for the
bulk of the net internal outflow. But the local attrition of natives and earlier migrants
is surprisingly balanced in terms of education. This may be explained by educational
differentials in geographical mobility22, though it is worth emphasizing (as I do below)
that changes in local education stocks may also reflect changes in the characteristics of
local birth cohorts.
In principle, lower employment rates should be reflected in lower real consumption
wages. While I find no impact on natives’ average residualized nominal wages23, housing
costs do respond positively (see also Saiz, 2007) - though the effect is statistically insignif-
icant. However, this masks some interesting heterogeneity: there is a small positive effect
on the wages of graduate natives, but they also experience larger increases in housing
expenditures (purged of local housing characteristics). Whether this reflects changes in
unobserved housing consumption or prices is open to interpretation, as I discuss in the
appendix. Certainly, an analysis of the impact on real consumption wages is challenging
- and not least because it is difficult to construct credible local wage deflators. This
underscores the potential advantages of studying welfare effects using local employment
rates, relying on the sufficient statistic result of Amior and Manning (2018).
6 Within-area estimates
6.1 Empirical specification
In contrast to my approach above, the seminal work in the literature has typically ex-
ploited variation in migration shocks within geographical areas. In principle, this should
help address the challenge of omitted local effects highlighted by Table 7. Peri and
22See e.g. Bound and Holzer (2000); Wozniak (2010); Notowidigdo (2011); Amior (2017a). In particu-
lar, using the same data as this paper, Amior and Manning (2018) show the college graduate population
adjusts fully to local employment shocks within one decade; and any sluggishness in local adjustment is
due to non-graduates.
23Wage effects may be difficult to interpret in the context of declining employment rates, if it is the
lowest paid natives who are leaving employment: see Card (2001) and Bratsberg and Raaum (2012).
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Sparber (2011) recommend the following estimating equation:
λˆIsrt = δ
w
0 + δ
w
1 λˆ
F
srt + drt + dst + εsrt (37)
where λˆFsrt and λˆ
I
srt are the foreign and residual contributions to population in skill group
s in area r. I specify these analogously to (24) and (25):
λˆ
F
srt ≡ log
(
Lsrt−1 + L
F
srt
Lsrt−1
)
(38)
λˆIsrt ≡ log
(
Lsrt − L
F
srt
Lsrt−1
)
(39)
where LFsrt is the stock of new migrants (arriving in the US since t−1) of skill s in area r.
drt are area-time interacted fixed effects, which absorb local shocks common to all skill
groups; and dst are skill-time interacted effects, which account for national-level trends
across skill groups. Note this approach differs from the analysis in Section 5.3, which
studies education-specific responses to aggregate-level CZ shocks.
The coefficient of interest, δw1 , identifies the impact of skill-specific foreign inflows on
local skill composition - or more precisely, on the contribution of existing US residents
to local skill composition. Comparable estimates of δw1 in the literature are typically
small and sometimes positive (Card and DiNardo, 2000; Card, 2001, 2005; Cortes, 2008),
though Borjas (2006) and Monras (2015b) offer alternative views.24 Either way, a small δw1
is not necessarily inconsistent with large geographical crowd-out. This is for two reasons.
First, changes in local skill composition reflect not only differential internal mobility, but
also changes in the characteristics of local birth cohorts. And second, as Card (2001) and
Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2016) point out, δw1 does not account for the labor
market impact that new migrant arrivals exert outside their own skill group s.
Regarding the latter point, it is useful to consider a simple example. Suppose produc-
tion technology in area r, for the tradable good priced at P , is a CES function (see e.g.
Card, 2001) over skill-defined local labor inputs: Yrt = ψrt (
∑
s αsrtN
σ
srt)
ρ
σ , where ψrt is an
aggregate productivity shifter, 1
1−σ
is the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs,
and the exponent ρ ≤ 1 allows for diminishing local returns. Assuming competitive labor
markets, local wage growth for skill type s can then be expressed as:
∆ (wsrt − pt) = ∆ logαsrt − (1− σ)∆nsrt +
σ
ρ
∆ logψrt +
ρ− σ
ρ
∆yrt (40)
24Borjas’ (2006) estimates imply that each new migrant crowds out 0.61 natives (within skill groups)
across metropolitan areas, though his methodology is disputed by Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card
and Peri (2016). Monras (2015b) identifies a substantial negative δw1 (insignificantly different from one-
for-one) using annual variation - in the year following the Mexican Peso crisis of 1995. But he estimates
a small effect for a longer decadal interval.
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Consider a skill-specific expansion of local employment ∆nsrt, driven by foreign migration.
The area-time fixed effects drt in (37) will absorb the local wage effect which is common to
all skill groups, as encapsulated by ∆yrt in (40). Conditional on the drt, the wage response
is then the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, i.e. 1 − σ. Intuitively, for larger σ,
the impact on wages is more diffused across the various skill groups - and the same will
be true of any mobility response. So even in the absence of cohort effects, δw1 will not
in general identify an aggregate-level crowding-out effect akin to δ1 in (35). The single
exception is the case of an additively separable production function (i.e. σ = ρ), which
ensures no diffusion of wage effects. In Appendix A.6, I offer a more formal mapping of
this multi-skill model onto the empirical specification (37), accounting for skill-specific
population dynamics.
6.2 Estimates of δw1
In practice, we do not know the “true” skill delineation: this is ultimately a decision for
the researcher. But in light of the discussion above, empirical estimates of δw1 are likely
to be sensitive to this decision, as different skill delineations will artificially engender
different elasticities of substitution. In Table 9, I present estimates of δw1 in (37) for four
different education-based25 “skill” delineations: (i) college graduates / non-graduates; (ii)
at least one year of college / no college (see Monras, 2015b); (iii) high school dropouts /
all others (Card, 2005; Cortes, 2008); (iv) four groups: dropouts, high school graduates,
some college and college graduates (e.g. Borjas, 2006).
To explore the role of cohort effects, I also present estimates using both pooled census
cross-sections and (to isolate an impact on internal mobility) a longitudinal dimension of
the census: respondents were asked where they lived five years previously. This question,
previously exploited by Card (2001) and Borjas (2006), is available in the 1980, 1990 and
2000 census extracts, yielding information on migratory flows over 1975-1980, 1985-1990
and 1995-2000.26 To preserve comparability, I restrict the pooled cross-section sample to
the same three decades: the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
For the purposes of the longitudinal estimates, I continue to define λˆIsrt and λˆ
F
srt
according to (38) and (39), but time intervals are now five years: so LFsrt is the stock of
25A key drawback of the education classifications is occupational downgrading of migrants. Card (2001)
addresses this concern by probabilistically assigning individuals to broad occupation groups (conditional
on education and demographic characteristics), separately for natives and migrants. I offer estimates
using these imputed occupation groups in Appendix I.
26Previous residence is only classified by state in the 1970 census microdata, and the ACS (after 2000)
only reports place of residence 12 months previously. See Appendix B.4 for further data details. I exploit
this same census question to disaggregate the contributions of inflows and outflows to the aggregate-level
crowding out effect in Appendix E.4.
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migrants who arrived in the US within the previous five years; and the initial population
Lsrt−1 is constructed using information on where current census respondents lived five
years previously. As a result, the residual contribution λˆIsrt will not account for emigration
from the US. But to the extent that emigration is a response to an individual’s local
economic environment, my estimate should then understate any crowding out effect.
In an effort to exclude skill-specific local demand shocks (αsrt in the model), I instru-
ment the foreign inflow λˆFsrt in (37) using a skill-specific migrant shift-share - following
the methodology of Card (2001). Building on equation (32) above:
µˆsrt = log
(
Lsrt−1 +
∑
o φ
o
rt−1L
F
os(−r)t
Lsrt−1
)
(41)
where new migrants of origin o and skill s are allocated proportionately according to
the initial co-patriot geographical distribution. Again, for the longitudinal specification,
the pre-period relates to five years previously, and µˆsrt is constructed to predict the
contribution of new migrants to the CZ-skill cell over five years (rather than a decade).
As is clear from columns 1 and 4, µˆsrt is a strong instrument in all specifications.
The pooled cross-section estimates of δw1 are remarkably large, ranging from 1 to 1.5 for
the full residual contribution in column 2 (accounting for both natives and old migrants).
That is, each new foreign migrant in a given CZ-skill cell attracts an additional 1-1.5
workers to the same cell (relative to other cells). A comparison with column 3 reveals
that these positive effects are (more than) entirely driven by natives.
In contrast, the longitudinal estimates of δw1 in column 5 are universally negative.
They also vary considerably in magnitude, ranging from -3.6 for the college graduate/non-
graduate delineation to just -0.19 for the four-group delineation. In most cases, natives
contribute substantially to these effects (column 6). The model offers a rationale for
this variation: finer delineations (such as the four-group) should engender greater substi-
tutability in production (i.e. larger σ) and consequently lower estimates of δw1 . Also, if
high school dropouts are close substitutes with other non-college workers (see e.g. Card,
2009a), the relatively low δw1 in the third row (-0.43) is perhaps understandable. Using
identical longitudinal data (from the 1990 census), Card (2001) estimates a δw1 which
is somewhat positive. In Appendix I, I find the divergence of our estimates is mostly
explained by the choice of right hand side controls and geographical sample.27
27Card controls for a range of demographic means at time t−5 within the skill-area cells (age, education,
migrants’ years in US), and he restricts his sample to the top 175 MSAs. Of course, the controls may
be picking up important skill-specific shocks which I have neglected; and similarly, there may be good
reasons to prefer his MSA restriction. The purpose of Appendix I is merely to show how our results can
be reconciled.
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6.3 Cohort effects
The difference between the pooled cross-section and longitudinal estimates is suggestive
of large cohort effects. In Appendix G, I offer more direct evidence for cohort effects by
exploiting census information on individuals’ state of birth. Specifically, using the same
estimating equation (37), I show that foreign inflows to a given state exert a larger impact
on the education composition of natives born in that state than on those residing in it.
As an example, consider a CZ which receives an inflow of low educated immigrants.
Despite large geographical crowd-out of low educated natives, the native college share
will typically contract relative to elsewhere. This is because the crowding out effect is
more than offset by a decline in the education levels of local birth cohorts.
At first sight, these cohort effects may appear counterintuitive. Low-skilled immigra-
tion should raise the return to education and stimulate greater investment (see Hunt,
2017). But the effect could in principle go the other way: Llull (2017) argues a fall in
wages may discourage labor market attachment and the accumulation of human capital.
7 Conclusion
The US suffers from large and persistent regional disparities in employment rates. It is
often claimed that foreign migration offers a remedy: given that new migrants are more
mobile geographically, they “grease the wheels” of the labor market and accelerate local
adjustment (Borjas, 2001). In terms of policy, if migrants are indeed regionally flexible,
forcibly dispersing them within receiving countries may actually hurt natives as well as
the migrants themselves.
Building on important work by Cadena and Kovak (2016), I find that new foreign
migrants account for 30 to 60 percent of the local population response to Bartik-identified
employment shocks. However, I find that population growth is not significantly larger
in areas better supplied by new migrants, nor more responsive to these shocks. This
is fundamentally a story of “crowding out”: I estimate that new foreign migrants to
commuting zones crowd out existing US residents one-for-one. This effect is entirely
driven by a reduction in migratory inflows, rather than larger outflows. The crowding
out result does conflict with some of the existing literature, but I attempt to show how
these estimates can be reconciled. The magnitude of the effect is certainly puzzling, given
sluggishness in the migratory response to demand shocks, as well as the adverse effect
of foreign inflows on local employment rates. However, undercoverage of unauthorized
migrants in the census may be overstating the crowding out effect - and understating the
foreign contribution to local adjustment.
Methodologically, I offer tools to identify the local impact of migration shocks in
the context of local dynamics. Building on Pischke and Velling (1997) and Amior and
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Manning (2018), I account for an area’s initial conditions using the lagged employment
rate, which (new to this paper) I adjust for local demographic composition. And I
present empirical evidence that this sufficient statistic approach can help address some
of the principal threats to identification discussed in the migration literature.
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A Theoretical extensions and derivations
A.1 Expressing γI in terms of flow elasticities
The parameter γI in (7) is the elasticity of the stock of existing local residents, while γF
in (8) is the elasticity of the flow from abroad. Here, I offer a brief sketch of how γI
can itself be expressed in terms of flow elasticities. Suppose there are individuals moving
both to and from area r even in the absence of local utility differentials, due perhaps to
idiosyncratic amenity or job shocks. Let λIir and λ
Io
r denote the contributions to local
population growth from internal inflows and outflows respectively, where the net inflow
λIr is equal to λ
Ii
r − λ
Io
r . In steady-state, i.e. in the absence of local utility differentials,
suppose these are both equal to µIr. And suppose also that the response of these inflows
and outflows takes the same form as (8), so:
λIir − µ
I
r
µIr
= γIi (nr − lr − z
sa
r ) (A1)
and
λIor − µ
I
r
µIr
= −γIo (nr − lr − z
sa
r ) (A2)
It then follows that:
λIr = µ
I
r
(
γIi + γIo
)
(nr − lr − z
sa
r ) (A3)
And thus, γI in (7) can be expressed as µIr
(
γIi + γIo
)
, where γIi and γIo are the elasticities
of the internal flows (both in and out), and µIr is the steady-state rate of internal in- (and
out-) migration. The empirical evidence suggests the internal population response to
local differentials is largely driven by γIi rather than γIo: see Appendix E.4.
A.2 Moving to discrete time: Derivations of (11), (12) and (13)
I first show how equation (9) can be discretized to yield (11), following similar steps
to Amior and Manning (2018). I assume local migrant intensity µr is constant within
discrete time intervals, and I denote µrt as the migrant intensity in the interval (t− 1, t].
Similarly, γrt is the aggregate elasticity in area r in the interval (t− 1, t], where:
γrt = γ
I + γFµrt (A4)
Now, let xr (τ) denote the value of some variable x in area r at time τ . Notice that (9)
can be written as:
∂eγrttlr (τ)
∂τ
|τ=t = e
γrttµrt + γrte
γrtt [nr (t)− z
sa
r (t)] (A5)
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This has as a solution:
eγrttlr (t) = lr (t− 1) +
∫ t
t−1
eγrtτ [µrt + γrtnr (τ)− γrtz
τa
r (τ)] dτ (A6)
Rearranging:
lr (t)− lr (t− 1) =
∫ t
t−1
e−γrt(t−τ) [µrt + γrtnr (τ)− γrtnr (t− 1)− γrtz
τa
r (τ)] dτ
+
(
1− e−γrtt
)
[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)] (A7)
and again:
lr (t)− lr (t− 1) =
∫ t
t−1
e−γrt(t−τ)dτ · µrt + [nr (t)− nr (t− 1)] (A8)
− [zsar (t)− z
sa
r (t− 1)]−
∫ t
t−1
eγrt(τ−t) [n˙r (τ)− z˙
sa
r (τ)] dτ
+
(
1− e−γrtt
)
[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)− z
sa
r (t− 1)]
Assuming employment nr and the supply/amenity shifter z
sa
r change at a constant rate
over the interval, this yields:
lr (t)− lr (t− 1) =
(
1− e−γrt
γrt
)
µrt (A9)
+
(
1−
1− e−γrt
γrt
)
[nr (t)− nr (t− 1)− z
sa
r (t) + z
sa
r (t− 1)]
+
(
1− e−γrtt
)
[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)− z
sa
r (t− 1)]
which is (11).
I now derive discrete-time formulations of the foreign and internal contributions to
local population change, i.e. λFrt and λ
I
rt respectively. I begin by substituting (9) for
(nr − lr − z
sa
r ) in (8). This yields:
λFr (τ) = µrt +
γFµrt
γ
[dlr (τ)− µrt] (A10)
for τ ∈ (t− 1, t]. Integrating this expression between t− 1 and t then gives:
λFrt = µrt +
γFµrt
γ
(∆lrt − µrt) (A11)
where λFrt ≡
∫ t
t−1 λ
F
rt (τ) dτ is the foreign contribution over the interval. Equation (12) can
then be derived by substituting (11) for the aggregate population change ∆lrt.
One can follow an identical procedure for the internal contribution. Substituting (9)
for (nr − lr − z
sa
r ) in (7):
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λIr (τ) =
γI
γ
[dlr (τ)− µrt] (A12)
for τ ∈ (t− 1, t]. Then, integrating between t− 1 and t:
λIrt =
γI
γ
(∆lrt − µrt) (A13)
and equation (13) follows after substituting (11) for ∆lrt.
A.3 Population responses to µrt: Derivations of (14) and (15)
It is useful to begin by characterizing (12) and (13) as functions of µrt. Replacing the
aggregate elasticity γrt with γ
I + γFµrt:
fF (µrt) = µrt +
γFµrt
γI + γFµrt
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
−γFµrt
γI + γFµrt
)
(∆nrt −∆z
s
rt − µrt) (A14)
+
γFµrt
γI + γFµrt
(
1− e−γ
I
−γFµrt
) (
nt−1 − lt−1 − z
s
rt−1
)
and
fI (µrt) =
γI
γI + γFµrt
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
−γFµrt
γI + γFµrt
)
(∆nrt −∆z
s
rt − µrt) (A15)
+
γI
γI + γFµrt
(
1− e−γ
I
−γFµrt
) (
nt−1 − lt−1 − z
s
rt−1
)
which summarize the foreign and internal contributions to local population growth re-
spectively. Taking first order approximations of these functions around µrt = 0:
fF (µrt) ≈ fF (0) + µrtf
′
F (0) (A16)
and
fI (µrt) ≈ fI (0) + µrtf
′
I (0) (A17)
which yield equations (14) and (15) in the main text.
A.4 Housing market specification: Derivation of (19)
Given the sufficient statistic result (which allows me to focus exclusively on stocks rather
than prices), a formal specification of the housing market is not required to derive most
of the population adjustment equations in Section 2. However, such a specification is
necessary to derive the “unconditional” crowding out equation (20), and I offer a tractable
version here.
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Suppose workers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the traded good and housing,
so they spend a fixed fraction ν of their income on housing. See Davis and Ortalo-Magne
(2011) for empirical evidence in support of this assumption. This implies a simple linear
expression for the local price index:
prt = νp
h
rt + (1− ν) pt (A18)
For simplicity, I assume non-employed individuals receive no income. Housing demand
in area r can then be written as:
Hdrt = ν
WrtNrt
P hrt
(A19)
and in logarithms:
hdrt = log ν + wrt + nrt − p
h
rt (A20)
I now turn to housing supply. Again for simplicity, I assume housing production does not
depend on local labor, but see the Online Appendices of Amior and Manning (2018) for
such an extension. Suppose housing supply can be written as:
hsrt = ǫ
hs
(
phrt − pt
)
(A21)
Equating supply and demand, and substituting (A18) for phrt:
prt − pt =
ν
1− ν + ǫhs
[
log ν +
1
ǫs
(nrt − lrt − z
s
rt) + nrt
]
(A22)
Taking first differences then yields equation (19) in the main text:
∆ (prt − pt) =
1
κ
[
1
ǫs
(∆nrt −∆lrt −∆z
s
rt) + ∆nrt
]
(A23)
where
κ ≡
1− ν + ǫhsr
ν
(A24)
is increasing in the elasticity of housing supply.
A.5 Semi-structural equations: Derivations of (18), (20) and (22)
Following the procedure outlined in Appendix A.2, (17) can be discretized to yield:
∆lrt = λ
F
rt +
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)(
∆nrt − λ
F
rt −∆z
sa
rt
)
+
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
(A25)
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Equation (18) then follows after subtracting the foreign contribution λFrt on both sides:
λIrt =
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)(
∆nrt − λ
F
rt −∆z
sa
rt
)
+
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nrt−1 − lrt−1 − z
sa
rt−1
)
(A26)
I now turn to the “unconditional” crowding out specification, (20). This requires a
solution for local employment. Using the labor supply and demand curves, (2) and (3),
changes in local employment can be expressed as:
∆nrt =
ǫs
ǫs + ǫd
∆zdrt +
ǫd
ǫs + ǫd
(∆lrt +∆z
s
rt)−
ǫsǫd
ǫs + ǫd
∆(prt − pt) (A27)
Replacing the local price deviation ∆ (prt − pt) with (A23):
∆nrt = η
κ
κ+ ǫd
∆zdrt + (1− η) (∆lrt +∆z
s
rt) (A28)
and disaggregating local population growth ∆lrt into foreign and internal contributions:
∆nrt = η
κ
κ+ ǫd
∆zdrt + (1− η)
(
λFrt + λ
I
rt +∆z
s
rt
)
(A29)
where
η ≡
(
1 +
κ + 1
κ+ ǫd
·
ǫd
ǫs
)
−1
(A30)
Equation (20) can then be derived by substituting (A29) for ∆nrt in (A26).
To derive the response of the local employment rate ∆ (nrt − lrt), I first subtract ∆lrt
from (A29):
∆ (nrt − lrt) = η
κ
κ+ ǫd
∆zdrt + (1− η)∆z
s
rt − η
(
λFrt + λ
I
rt
)
(A31)
where I have again disaggregated ∆lrt into λ
I
rt and λ
F
rt. Equation (22) then follows after
substituting (20) for λIrt.
A.6 Derivation of within-area empirical specification
In this appendix, I show how the multi-skill model described in Section 6.1 can be mapped
onto the empirical specification (37), accounting for skill-specific population dynamics.
In line with (2) in Section 2, I first write a skill-specific equation for labor supply:
nsr = lsr + ǫ
s (wsr − pr) + z
s
sr (A32)
Similarly, I rewrite indirect utility (4) for skill group s. This depends on the skill-specific
amenity value and real consumption wage, which itself can be replaced with the employ-
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ment rate using (A32)
vsr = wsr − pr + asr (A33)
=
1
ǫs
(nsr − lsr − z
s
sr) + asr
Notice that local labor market conditions for skill group s can be fully summarized by
the skill-specific employment rate (nsr − lsr): this is a skill-specific version of the suffi-
cient statistic result in Section 2. Skill s subscripts can also be applied to the dynamic
population responses, equations (7) and (8). That is, skill population adjusts (sluggishly)
with elasticities γI and γF to skill-specific differentials in local utility vsr. For simplicity,
I assume here that the elasticities γI and γF are common to all skill groups, but I permit
skill heterogeneity in the migrant intensity µsr:
λIsr = γ
I (nsr − lsr − z
s
sr + asr) (A34)
λFsr − µsr
µsr
= γF (nsr − lsr − z
s
sr + asr) (A35)
By symmetry with the model in Section 2, these equations can be discretized to yield a
skill-specific version of (18):
λIsrt =
(
1−
1− e−γ
I
γI
)(
∆nsrt − λ
F
srt −∆z
s
srt +∆asrt
)
(A36)
+
(
1− e−γ
I
) (
nsrt−1 − lsrt−1 − z
s
srt−1 + asrt−1
)
To derive the unconditional crowding out effect, I require a solution for local skill-specific
employment ∆nsrt. Given (A32) and the skill demand relationship in (40), this can be
characterized as:
∆nsrt =
ǫs
1 + ǫs (1− σ)
(
∆ logαsrt +
σ
ρ
∆ logψrt +
ρ− σ
ρ
∆yrt −∆prt +∆pt
)
+
1
1 + ǫs (1− σ)
(∆lsrt +∆z
s
srt) (A37)
Substituting this for ∆nsrt in (A36), this yields:
λIsrt =
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
(
1
1− σ
∆ logαsrt − λ
F
srt −∆z
s
srt +
1
ζ
∆asrt
)
(A38)
+
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
·
1
1− σ
(
σ
ρ
∆ logψrt +
ρ− σ
ρ
∆yrt −∆prt +∆pt
)
+
γI
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
(
nsrt−1 − lsrt−1 − z
s
srt−1 + asrt−1
)
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where
ζ ≡
ǫs (1− σ)
1 + ǫs (1− σ)
(A39)
Now consider how this maps onto the within-area empirical specification (37). The area-
time fixed effects drt will absorb the contents of the second line of (A38). The skill-time
fixed effects dst will absorb any skill-time varying components of the skill-specific demand
shock ∆ logαsrt, skill-specific supply shock ∆z
s
srt, skill-specific amenity shock ∆asrt and
the initial conditions on the final line of (37). All remaining variation will fall into the
error term εsrt, so the IV exclusion restriction requires that it is uncorrelated with the
skill-specific migrant shift-share µˆsrt. Under these conditions (and the model’s various
assumptions), the coefficient of interest δw1 will identify the coefficient on λ
F
srt in (A38):
δw1 =
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
1 +
(
γI
1−e−γI
− 1
)
ζ
(A40)
As I state in Section 6.1, δw1 is increasing in the internal mobility response γ
I , but de-
creasing in the elasticity of substitution σ between skill types in production.
B Data manipulation
B.1 Population
I take local population counts of individuals aged 16-64 from published county-level cen-
sus statistics (based on 100 percent samples), extracted from the National Historical
Geographic Information System (NHGIS: Manson et al., 2017). See Table A1 of the
Online Appendix of Amior and Manning (2018) for table references. Commuting Zones
(CZs) are composed of groups of counties, in line with Tolbert and Sizer (1996). Like
Amior and Manning (2018), I make one modification to the Tolbert-Sizer scheme to fa-
cilitate construction of consistent geographies over time: I move La Paz County (AZ) to
the same CZ as Yuma County (AZ). These counties only separated in 1983, but Tolbert
and Sizer’s 1990 scheme allocates them to different CZs.
Following Amior and Manning (2018), I disaggregate the total population of 16-64s
into native and foreign-born components using local shares computed from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS: Ruggles et al., 2017) microdata samples. I use
this procedure to compute local counts for other demographic cells also: specifically,
recent foreign-born arrivals (in the US for 10 years or less), longer term migrants, and
these in turn (together with the native-born) disaggregated by education. In practice,
the sub-state geographical identifiers included in the IPUMS microdata do not coincide
with CZ boundaries, and these identifiers vary by census year.28 Similarly to Autor and
28The 1940 and 1950 census extracts divide the continental US into 467 State Economic Areas, the
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Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), I estimate population counts at the
intersection of the available geographical identifiers and CZs29, and I impute CZ-level
data using these counts as weights.
I use the following IPUMS samples for this exercise: the American Community Sur-
veys (ACS) of 2009, 2010 and 2011 (pooled together) for the 2010 cross-section; the 5 per
cent census extracts for 2000, 1990, 1980 and 1960; and the (pooled) forms 1 and 2 metro
samples of 1970 (each of which are 1 per cent extracts). Regarding 1970, information on
years in the US is only available in the form 1 sample.
B.2 Employment
Section 3.2 describes how I construct composition-adjusted local employment rates. Here,
I offer further detail on the specifics. I begin by running probit regressions of a binary em-
ployment indicator on a detailed set of individual characteristics and a full set of location
fixed effects, separately for each census cross-section (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000)
and the pooled ACS cross-sections of 2009-11. The individual controls consist of: age
and age squared; four education indicators30, each interacted with age and age squared; a
gender dummy, interacted with all previously-mentioned variables; black/Asian/Hispanic
indicators, interacted with all previously-mentioned variables; and a foreign-born indica-
tor, interacted with all previously-mentioned variables. And finally, to the extent that
it is possible in each cross-section, I control for years in the US (among the foreign-
born), again interacted with all previously-mentioned variables. This information is not
consistently reported in each cross-section, so the variables I use vary by year:
ACS 2009-11: Years in US, years in US squared.
Census 2000: Years in US, years in US squared.
Census 1990: The census only reports years in US as a categorical variable. I
take the mid-point of each category (and its square), and I also include a dummy for
top-category cases.
1960 extract uses 2,287 “Mini” Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), the 1970 extracts (the forms 1
and 2 metro samples) use 405 county groups, 1980 uses 1,148 county groups, 1990 uses 1,713 PUMAs,
and the 2000 census extract and American Community Survey (until 2011) use 2,057 PUMAs.
29To this end, following Amior and Manning (2018), I use county-SEA lookup ta-
bles from IPUMS (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/volii/ sea_county_components.xls)
for 1940 and 1950; and I use county group lookup tables from IPUMS
for 1970 and 1980 (https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/volii/1970cgcc.xls and
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/volii/cg98stat.xls). For 1960, I have relied on a preliminary
lookup table linking Mini PUMAs to counties (with population counts at the intersections),
kindly shared by Joe Grover at IPUMS. And for the 1990 and 2000 PUMAs, I have generated
population counts using the MABLE/Geocorr applications at the Missouri Census Data Center:
http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr_index.shtml.
30High school graduate (12 years of education), some college education (1 to 3 years of college),
undergraduate degree (4 years of college) and postgraduate degree (more than 4 years of college). High
school dropouts (less than 12 years of education) are the omitted category.
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Census 1980: Same as 1990. Except those who were citizens at birth do not report
years in US: I code all these cases with a dummy variable.
Census 1970: Same as 1980. Except some respondents do not report years in US:
I code all these non-response cases with a dummy variable. I also include an additional
binary indicator for migrants who report living abroad five years previously (based on a
different census question), which is available for the full sample.
Census 1960: No information on years in US is available.
All these variables (relating to years in US) are interacted with all previously-mentioned
variables in the probit specification. For the 1970 specification, I exclude foreign-born
individuals in the form 2 sample, since these do not report years in the US.
Regarding the location fixed effects, I include indicators for the local geographies
available in each census year (see Section B.1) in the probit regressions. Using the probit
output, I then predict the average employment rate in each local area - for a distribu-
tion of local demographic characteristics identical to the full national sample. I then
impute composition-adjusted employment rates at the CZ level by taking weighted aver-
ages (across the available geographical units), using the population weights described in
Section B.1. These are demanding specifications: to reduce the number of fixed effects in
the probit regressions as much as possible, I aggregate together geographical units which
are subsumed within the same CZs.
B.3 Shift-share instruments
I construct the Bartik industry shift-shares in identical fashion to Amior and Manning
(2018). The sample is based on employed individuals aged 16-64 in the IPUMS census
extracts and ACS samples. I identify industries using the IPUMS consistent classification
based on the 1950 census scheme31, aggregated to the 2-digit level32 (yielding 57 codes).
As with the population counts (see above), I impute CZ-level employment counts (by
industry) by weighting data from the corresponding sub-state geographical identifiers.
Similarly, in the construction of the migrant shift-share µˆrt, I impute CZ-level migrant
population counts (across 77 origin countries) by weighting across these same identifiers.
A key input to µˆrt is the number of new migrants (by origin o) arriving in the US in the
previous ten years (and residing outside area r): i.e. LFo(−r)t in equation (32) in Section
3.3. This information is available in all census years from 1970 inclusive, thus covering
foreign inflows from the 1960s onwards. However, in some empirical specifications, I
require values of µˆrt for 1960 (covering the 1950s inflow). For that decade, I impute
foreign inflows using cohort changes: I compute the difference between (i) the stock of
31See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ_ind.shtml.
32I further aggregate all wholesale sectors to a single category to address inconsistencies between census
extracts, and similarly for public administration and finance/insurance/real estate. I also omit the “Not
specified manufacturing industries” code.
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migrants of origin o in 1960 (outside area r) and (ii) the stock of migrants of origin o in
1950 aged 6-54 (again, outside r).
B.4 Longitudinal information on place of residence
In Section 6.2, I exploit longitudinal residential information in the 1980, 1990 and 2000
IPUMS census microdata to estimate δw1 in equation (37). These census years include
data on respondents’ place of residence five years previously, using various sub-state
geographical identifiers.33 I compute population (both current and 5-year historical) in
the various cells of interest (native, foreign-born, recent foreign arrival, by education
category) at the level of the available geographical identifiers. And I impute CZ-level
data by taking weighted averages of these, using the population weights described in
footnote 29.
C Effect of years in US on long-distance mobility
In this appendix, I offer some evidence on the gross mobility of natives and migrants
within the US, based on American Community Survey (ACS) samples between 2000 and
2016. 2.8 percent of native-born individuals aged 16-64 report living in a different state
12 months previously (conditional on living in the US at that time), compared to 2.4
percent of the foreign born.34 However, the foreign-born share masks some important
heterogeneity by years in the US. In what follows, I show that new migrants are in fact
more mobile across states than natives, but this differential is eliminated within five years.
To identify the effect of years in the US, it is important to control for entry co-
hort effects (Borjas, 1985) and observation year effects. To control for these, I estimate
complementary log-log models for the annual incidence of cross-state migration (see e.g.
Amior, 2017a). Let MigRate (Xi) denote the instantaneous cross-state migration rate
conditional on a vector of individual characteristics Xi. An individual i moves between
states over a time horizon τ with probability:
Pr (Migτi = 1) = 1− exp (−MigRate (Xi) τ) (A41)
33See also footnote 28. The 1980 census extract identifies both current and historical residence in
the continental US using the same 1,148 county groups. The 1990 extract identifies current residence
using 1,713 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) and historical residence using 1,139 areas (PUMAs or
PUMA combinations). In 2000, current residence is classified by 2,057 PUMAs and historical residence
by 1,017 PUMAs or PUMA combinations. For 1990 and 2000, I conduct my analysis at the higher level
of aggregation.
34As an aside, a larger share of foreign-born individuals (2.9 percent) report living abroad one year
ago.
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This gives rise to a complementary log-log model:
Pr (Migτi = 1) = 1− exp (− exp (π
′Xi) τ) (A42)
where the π parameters (to be estimated) are the elasticities of the instantaneous migra-
tion rate MigRate (Xi) with respect to the characteristics in Xi. Assuming a constant
hazard, this interpretation of the π parameters is independent of the time horizon τ as-
sociated with the data. I define a cross-state migrant as somebody living in a different
state 12 months previously (as reported by the ACS), so I implicitly normalize τ to one
year. The Xi vector includes the following variables:
π′Xi =
20∑
k=1
πY RSk Y rsUSk +
2015∑
k=1981
πY RIk Y rImmigk +
2016∑
k=2001
πY RIk Y rObsk (A43)
The sample for this exercise consists of (1) natives aged 16-64 living in the US one
year previously (22.6m observations) and (2) foreign-born individuals aged 16-64 with
between 1 and 20 years in the US (2.2m). Thus, there are 21 demographic groups:
natives, migrants with 1 years in US, migrants with 2 years, ..., migrants with 20 years.
I include in the Xi vector binary indicators for the final 20 groups, i.e. Y rsUSk for k
between 1 and 20, so natives are the omitted category. I also control for a full set of entry
cohort effects, Y rImmigk (ranging from 1981 to 2015 in my sample, with natives again
the omitted category), and a full set of observation year effects, Y rObsk. I assume here
that the observation year effects are common to natives and migrants.
Panel A of Figure A1 reports the basic coefficient estimates on the years in US dum-
mies, together with the 95 percent confidence intervals. The estimates can be interpreted
as the log point difference in cross-state mobility between migrants (with given years in
US) and natives, controlling for entry cohort and observation year effects. Migrants are
initially more mobile than natives: the deviation at the entry year is 93 log points. But
this falls to zero by year 6 and becomes negative thereafter, dropping to -49 log points
by year 20.
In Panel B, I estimate the same empirical model, but this time controlling for a full
set of single-year age effects. Age effects are important here because individuals with
fewer years in the US will typically be younger, and the young are known to be more
mobile for other reasons (see e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2011). Thus, without age controls,
I am likely to overestimate mobility of new immigrants relative to natives. And indeed,
this is what the results suggest: the deviation at year 1 is now somewhat lower, at 68
log points. The gradient in Panel B is still negative, but shallower than Panel A: the
coefficient touches zero at year 5 and reaches -31 log points by year 20.
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D Supplementary estimates of contributions to local
adjustment
D.1 Robustness to specification
In Tables A1, A2 and A3, I study the robustness of my IV estimates of the foreign
contribution to local adjustment - both the average contributions (in columns 1-4 of
each table) and heterogeneity in these contributions along the support of the migrant
shift-share (columns 5-8), together with the associated internal population responses.
Table A1 focuses on the robustness to specification choices. For reference, Panel A
reproduces the estimates from the main text: i.e. the average contributions in columns
5-8 of Table 1 (without the migrant shift-share control, µˆrt) and the heterogeneous con-
tributions in columns 5-8 of Table 3. In Panel B, in an effort to account for time-invariant
unobserved components of supply/amenity effects in ∆zsart and z
sa
rt−1 in equation (11), I
control for CZ fixed effects - which effectively partial out CZ-specific linear trends in pop-
ulation. The aggregate population response is larger, at least to the lagged employment
rate (column 1); but the average foreign contribution to this response is almost entirely
eliminated (column 2). This is perhaps to be expected: the fixed effects pick up much of
the same variation as the migrant shift-share µˆrt (which is locally very persistent); and
Table 1 in the main text shows that controlling for µˆrt also eliminates much of the foreign
contribution. Having said that, the heterogeneous effects in columns 5-8 are not substan-
tially affected: there remains a large foreign contribution in high-µˆrt areas (though the
response to contemporaneous employment shocks is smaller), and this foreign contribu-
tion is fully crowded out by the residual contribution. It should be emphasized that this
is a very demanding specification, given the short panel length (just five periods) and the
four endogenous variables.
In Panel C of Table A1, I omit the lagged employment rate and its associated (lagged
Bartik) instrument - together with their interactions with the migrant intensity in columns
5-8. As one would expect (given serial correlation in the Bartik instrument), the response
to the contemporaneous employment change (column 1) is now larger. The difference is
substantial: compared to Panel A, the gap between the β1 coefficient (on the change in
current employment) and 1 (i.e. full adjustment) is halved. But the foreign contribution
(column 2) is similar in proportionate terms. And in columns 5-8, the foreign contribu-
tion continues to fully crowd out the internal contribution, at least in the response to
employment shocks (i.e. the “indirect” effect).
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Finally, Panel D uses raw instead of composition-adjusted employment variables, for
both the contemporaneous change and the lagged rate. The aggregate population re-
sponse in column 1 is now somewhat smaller. This result is intuitive. The local popula-
tion of better educated workers is known to respond more strongly (see e.g. Amior and
Manning, 2018), and these individuals also have higher employment rates. As a result,
the change in raw employment (on the right hand side) overstates the true change in
employment for an individual of fixed characteristics; and the population response to this
change must therefore be smaller. Despite this, the foreign contribution in column 2 is
similar in proportionate terms; and columns 5-8 show a similar crowding out effect. This
result should be reassuring: since adjusting local employment for observable characteris-
tics makes little difference to the results, one may be less concerned about the influence
of unobservables.
D.2 Robustness to amenity controls
In Table A2, I study the robustness of my estimates to the right hand side controls. In
Panel A, I control only for the full set of year effects - and exclude all amenity controls.
The aggregate population response (column 1) is similar to the main text, and the foreign
contribution (column 2) is proportionately larger - especially in response to the lagged
employment rate, where it actually exceeds the aggregate response. The coefficients
on the interaction terms in columns 5-8 continue to point to complete crowding out,
though the standard errors are now very large: the interactions effects are statistically
insignificant.
The same is true of Panel B, where I control for the basic amenity effects - but omit
the interactions between the amenity effects and the local migrant intensity, µˆrt. The
interactions with the employment effects in columns 5-8 are larger in magnitude, and the
standard errors are smaller - but the effects are still insignificant at the 5 percent level.
However, on the basis of the model in the main text, it is should be emphasized that the
omission of the amenity-µˆrt controls is a misspecification: see equations (14), (15) and
(16).
Panel C controls additionally for the amenity-µˆrt interactions. Columns 5-8 are now
identical to columns 5-8 of Table 3 in the main text. The foreign contribution to the
average response in column 2 is smaller than before. This reflects what happens in Table
1 in the main text when I control for migrant intensity µˆrt.
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D.3 Robustness to sample and weights
In Table A3, I vary the sample and weighting. Until now, I have studied local heterogene-
ity along a linear migrant intensity µˆrt effect: this follows the first order approximation
imposed in equation (14) in the model. But as I note in the main text, the µˆrt distribu-
tion is very skewed: the 98th percentile is 0.1, and the maximum is 0.29. In Panel A, I
consider the implications of omitting observations with µˆrt exceeding 0.1. As one would
expect, the average foreign contribution in column 2 is somewhat smaller - at least in
response to the lagged employment rate. But the heterogeneous effects in columns 5-8
are similar: we continue to see complete crowding out. This suggests the results are not
driven by a small number of outlying observations of µˆrt, and the linear approximation
may not be so unreasonable.
All the estimates in the main text are weighted by lagged population share. In Panel
B of Table A3, I study unweighted estimates. This places more emphasis on smaller
CZs which typically admit fewer foreign migrants. Unsurprisingly, the average foreign
contribution is now substantially lower. Column 6 shows the foreign contribution is
increasing with µˆrt, but the effect is smaller than before. However, there is now no
crowding out effect in column 7. It turns out this result is driven by some small towns
close to the Mexican border with unusually large migrant intensity (which contribute
little to the weighted estimates). Once I exclude CZs with 1960 population (of 16-64s)
below 25,000 (which account for 2 percent of the national population), column 7 now
shows evidence of crowding out. And the crowding out effect becomes effectively one-
for-one once I exclude CZs with 1960 population below 50,000. This exclusion removes
the majority of CZs (387 out of 722), but these account for just 7 percent of the national
population.
D.4 Average contributions by country/region of origin
One may be interested in whether the large foreign contribution identified in the main text
is driven by migrants of particular origins. I address this question in Table A4. Column 1
reports the average foreign contribution (among all origins groups) - which is identical to
column 2 of Table 1 in the main text, based on the empirical specification (33). And in the
remaining columns, I replace the dependent variable with the (approximate) contribution
from various origin groups: specifically λˆFort ≡ log
(
Lrt−1+LFort
Lrt−1
)
, where LFort is the stock of
new migrants of origin o in area r at time t, who arrived in the US in the previous ten
years. Looking at the IV estimates, all the origin groups contribute significantly to the
53
overall foreign response. And none particularly stand out, given the associated standard
errors and the shares of foreign migration reported in the penultimate row.
E Supplementary estimates of crowding out
E.1 Graphical illustration of crowding out estimates
I now consider the robustness of my “semi-structural” crowding out estimates in Section
5. One concern is that my estimates of the coefficient of interest, δ1, in equation (35)
may be driven by outliers. To address this point, Figure A2 graphically illustrates the
basic OLS and IV estimates of δ1, i.e. those of columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.
These plots follow the logic of the Frisch-Waugh theorem. For OLS, I compute resid-
uals from regressions of both the residual and foreign contributions (λˆIrt and λˆ
F
rt respec-
tively) on the remaining controls: the lagged employment rate, the current Bartik shift-
share, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects). And I then
plot the λˆIrt residuals against the λˆ
F
rt residuals.
For the IV plot, I apply the Frisch-Waugh logic to two-stage least squares. I begin by
generating predictions of the two endogenous variables (the contribution of new migrants,
λˆFrt, and the lagged employment rate, n˜rt−1 − lrt−1), based on the first stage regressions
(using the migrant shift-share µˆrt and lagged Bartik brt−1 instruments). I then compute
residuals from regressions of both λˆIrt and the predicted λˆ
F
rt on the remaining controls:
the predicted lagged employment rate, the current Bartik shift-share, year effects and the
amenity variables (interacted with year effects). And as before, I plot the λˆIrt residuals
against the λˆFrt residuals.
The marker size in the plots correspond to the lagged population share weights. The
(weighted) slopes of the fit lines are identical to the δ1 estimates in columns 1 and 2 in
Table 5. Note the standard errors (of course) do not match: I do not account for state
clustering in Figure A2; and for IV, the naive two stage estimator does not account for
sampling error in the first stage. In any case, it is clear from inspection that the δ1
estimates are not driven by outliers.
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E.2 Alternative IV strategies
The migrant shift-share instrument has faced a number of criticisms in the literature.
First, it may not successfully exclude shocks to local labor demand, especially if these
shocks are persistent. And second, if the migration shocks themselves are persistent, esti-
mated effects may be conflated with dynamic adjustment (see Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler,
2018). Addressing these challenges has been a major focus of this paper. But there are
other possible concerns, and I attempt to address some of these in Table A5.
Panel A offers estimates weighted by lagged population share, in line with the main
text. Column 1 reproduces the basic IV crowding out estimate in column 2 of Table 5,
based on equation (35). I instrument the foreign inflow λˆFrt using the migrant shift-share
µˆrt and the lagged employment rate using a lagged Bartik. Panel B offers unweighted
estimates of δ1: the coefficient is not much different (-0.94 rather than -1.1), though the
standard error is somewhat larger. This suggests the effects are not merely driven by
large CZs, consistent with the patterns in Figure A2.
Recall the migrant shift-share instrument µˆrt is given by log
(
Lrt−1+ΛFrt−1
Lrt−1
)
, where
ΛFrt−1 ≡
∑
o φ
o
rt−1L
F
o(−r)t is a shorthand for the predicted number of incoming migrants
between t − 1 and t: see equation (32). Notice I am using the t − 1 migrant settle-
ment patterns (in φort−1) to predict foreign inflows in each subsequent decade. But other
studies have taken a different approach: for example, Hunt (2017) predicts inflows in all
decades from 1940 to 2010 using the 1940 settlement patterns. In column 2, I replace
my instrument with log
(
Lrt−1+ΛF60rt−1
Lrt−1
)
, where ΛF60rt−1 ≡
∑
o φ
o
r60L
F
o(−r)t predicts the migrant
inflow based on 1960 settlement patterns, φor60, for every decade. The weighted and un-
weighted estimates are now somewhat larger (-1.4 and -1.5 respectively), though they are
not significantly different from -1.
In my basic crowding out specification (35), I approximate the foreign and residual
contributions (to the change in log population) as log
(
Lrt−1+LFrt
Lrt−1
)
and log
(
Lrt−L
F
rt
Lrt−1
)
respec-
tively. But much of the literature has taken a first order approximation, defining them
as
LFrt
Lrt−1
and
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
: see e.g. Card (2001), Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri
(2016). Column 3 re-estimates (35) using these definitions; and to maintain symmetry, I
replace the instrument with
ΛFrt
Lrt−1
. But this makes little difference to the estimate.
Another possible concern is the predictive power of the instrument. Suppose the pre-
dicted number of incoming migrants, ΛFrt, is largely noise. Then variation in Lrt−1 may
generate artificial positive correlation between the endogenous variable and the instru-
ment. This problem becomes worse if the LFrt component of the endogenous variable,
LFrt
Lrt−1
, is itself also noisy. Indeed, Aydemir and Borjas (2011) argue that measurement
error in the local migrant share can result in substantial attenuation bias, especially in
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the presence of fixed effects (which may absorb much of the meaningful variation). To
address this concern, in column 4, I replace the instrument (which is expressed relative
to the initial population) with the predicted inflow of new migrants in levels, ΛFrt. But
again, this has little effect on the crowding out estimate or even its standard error.
An important reference in this context is Wozniak and Murray (2012), who estimate
geographical crowd-out using a specification entirely expressed in levels. Building on
equation (35), a specification in levels would be:
∆Lrt − L
F
rt = δ0 + δ
L
1 L
F
rt + δ
L
2 brt + δ
L
3 (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + Artδ
L
A + εrt (A44)
where the dependent variable is the change in local population, less the stock of new
foreign migrants; and the key regressor LFrt is simply the number of new foreign migrants.
I estimate δL1 in column 5, yielding a coefficient on just -0.23 in Panel A. However,
local population is an important omitted variable in this specification (Wright, Ellis and
Reibel, 1997; Peri and Sparber, 2011; Wozniak and Murray, 2012): local population may
be correlated with both the inflow of new migrants and subsequent population change. To
address this concern, Wozniak and Murray recommend controlling for local fixed effects.
Once I include CZ fixed effects (column 6), my estimate of δL1 is again remarkably close
to -1 irrespective of weighting.
In column 7, I apply CZ fixed effects directly to the basic specification in column
1. These effectively partial out CZ-specific linear trends in population. This approach
is similar in spirit to the double differencing methodology (comparing changes before
and after 1970) of Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) and is recommended by Hong and
McLaren (2015). In terms of theory, the purpose of the fixed effects is to account for time-
invariant unobserved components of the amenity, supply or demand effects in equation
(20). But as I emphasize in Section (D.1), their inclusion in empirically demanding in
such a short panel, especially given the strong persistence in the migrant shift-share
instrument µˆrt. And as Aydemir and Borjas (2011) argue, measurement error may be
more of a problem here. With population weights, I estimate a δ1 of -0.63 with a very large
standard error (0.61). In column 8, to ease the demands of the specification, I replace
the lagged employment rate (i.e. the initial conditions) with historical shocks: a lagged
Bartik brt−1 (originally used as an instrument) and a lagged migrant shift-share µˆrt−1.
I now estimate a much larger δ1: -1.35, with a standard error of just 0.26. Without
population weights, I attain perversely large estimates of δ1 (in excess of -2) in both
columns 7 and 8, though the standard errors are also large. However, the first stage F-
statistics for the foreign inflow λˆFrt are small in the unweighted specifications: about 6 in
each case. I do not report fixed effect estimates using the 1960-based migrant shift-share:
this instrument has no power under fixed effects.
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E.3 Robustness of native contribution
The final column of Table 7 studies the robustness of the native contribution to the
crowding out effect, assessing the importance of various right hand side controls. But
the estimates in this column mask some important heterogeneity across decades. To
address this point, Table A6 reproduces the first six columns of Table 7, but replacing
the dependent variable λˆIrt with the native-only contribution λˆ
I,N
rt .
The general patterns are very similar to Table 7. Without any right hand side controls,
the crowding out effects vary substantially over time; but as the controls (both demand
and amenity effects) are progressively added, the crowding out estimates become more
substantial (close to or exceeding one-for-one) in almost every decade. There is one
important exception: the 2000s. Even with the full set of right hand side controls, the
response of the native contribution is effectively zero. This is despite the large crowding
out effect for the full residual contribution (i.e. natives and old migrants combined) in
the same decade in Table 7. In other words, previous migrants account for the entire δ1
effect in that decade. A natural explanation is large return migration of Mexicans in the
2000s (see e.g. Hanson, Liu and McIntosh, 2017), driven in part by the construction bust
and the Great Recession.
E.4 Contributions of inflows and outflows to crowding out
It turns out that the geographical crowd-out is entirely driven by a reduction in migratory
inflows to the affected CZ - rather than an increase in migratory outflows. And I present
the evidence in this appendix. Similarly to Section 6, I exploit the longitudinal dimension
of the census: respondents were asked where they were living five years previously. The
census publishes statistics on gross migratory flows between all county pairs. In line with
analysis in the Online Appendix of Amior and Manning (2018), I use data for the periods
1965-70, 1975-80, 1985-90 and 1995-2000, and I aggregate all flows to CZ level.35 The
flow data is available for individuals aged 15-64, rather than my usual 16-64 sample. One
might also use the microdata (as I do in Section 6.2), but the published statistics are
based on larger samples and require no geographical imputation.
My strategy is to re-estimate the crowding out equation (35), but replacing the foreign
and residual contributions to decadal population growth with 5-year flows. In particular,
35I thank Jack DeWaard for sharing the 1965-70 and 1975-80 flow data. I take the 1985-90 flow data
from the Socioeconomic Data and Application Center at Columbia University: see the P1 STP-28 tables
at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/acrp_enhance-migration-1990. I construct the 1995-2000
flows using the C2 A1 and B4 A1 tables on the Census 2000Migration DVD (kindly made available by Kin
Koerber); see https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/migration/mig_dvd.html. Comparable
data is not available for 2005-2010.
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my specification is:
λˆI5rt = δ0 + δ1λˆ
F5
rt + δ2brt + δ3 (n˜rt−10 − lrt−10) + ArtδA + εrt (A45)
where the t subscript now designates years, rather than decades (as in the main text),
and λˆF5rt and λˆ
I5
rt are respectively the 5-year foreign and internal contributions to the
change in log population. These are constructed in line with equations (24) and (25).
Specifically, λˆF5rt ≡ log
(
Lrt−5+LF5rt
Lrt−5
)
, where LF5rt is the 5-year flow into area r from abroad,
and Lrt−5 is the local population at time t − 5 (based on census respondents’ reported
place of residence five years previously). And in turn, λˆIrt ≡ log
(
Lrt−5+LIi5rt −L
Io5
rt
Lrt−5
)
, where
LIi5rt and L
Io5
rt are respectively the 5-year inflows and outflows to/from others parts of the
US. Notice that, by construction, Lrt ≡ Lrt−5+L
F5
rt +L
Ii5
rt −L
Io5
rt . Given that the flows are
based on the reports of time t residents, individuals who emigrated from the US between
t− 5 and t are excluded from this data.
I do not observe employment outcomes between census years (i.e. at 5 year intervals),
so I choose to use the same right hand side variables as in equation (35): the decadal
Bartik shift-share brt (which predicts employment growth between t − 10 and t), the
employment rate lagged ten years, and the amenity controls. The mismatch in time
periods is not ideal, and one should keep this in mind when interpreting the estimates.
I report OLS and IV estimates in Table A7. I instrument λˆF5rt using a five-year mi-
grant shift-share, constructed to predict the 5-year flow and based on migrant settlement
patterns in t− 5. I construct these settlement patterns using migrants’ reported histori-
cal residence in the census microdata of year t (i.e. following a similar procedure to the
longitudinal estimates of Section 6.2). I instrument the lagged employment rate using
the lagged decadal Bartik shift-share.
The standard errors on the OLS estimates are too large to make definitive statements.
But the IV estimates tell a much clearer story. Column 4 reports the basic δ1 estimate,
based on equation (A45). This points to a large crowding out effect (-1.6), somewhat in
excess of one-for-one. In the next two columns, I disaggregate the effect into (approxi-
mate) contributions from internal inflows and outflows: column 5 replaces the dependent
variable with λˆIi5rt ≡ log
(
Lrt−5+LIi5rt
Lrt−5
)
; and column 6 replaces it with λˆIo5rt ≡ log
(
Lrt−5+LIo5rt
Lrt−5
)
.
The crowding out effect is entirely driven by variation in inflows rather than outflows.
The effect on outflows is statistically insignificant.
E.5 State-level estimates of crowding out
In Section 5 of the main text, I have estimated the extent of geographical crowd-out
across specifically CZs. Interestingly, Borjas (2006) finds that the extent of crowd-out
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is smaller at higher-level geographical units, based on comparisons of estimates across
census divisions, states and metropolitan areas. The idea is intuitive: US residents are
less mobile across longer distances. In this appendix, I estimate crowding out effects
across states - but I still cannot reject one-for-one crowding out. However, given the loss
of variation in moving to state-level, the coefficients are less precisely estimated.
As before, I base my estimates on equation (35) in the main text, though I replace
the lagged employment rate control (nrt−1 − lrt−1) with a lagged Bartik shift-share brt−1
control. This is because I cannot successfully identify the lagged employment rate using
the lagged Bartik as an instrument in the state-level data. In line with my CZ estimates
(see Section 3.4), I control for state-level amenity effects: a binary indicator for a coastal
state (ocean or Great Lakes), maximum January temperature, maximum July tempera-
ture, mean July relative humidity, and log state-level population density in 1900. I also
control for year effects and a full set of interactions between the amenity variables and
year effects. My sample consists of five decadal observations of 49 geographical units: the
48 states of the continental US plus the District of Columbia.
I present my results in Table A8. Using OLS, I estimate a δ1 of -0.67 (column 1). The
IV estimate in column 2 is -1.3, a little larger than the CZ-based estimate in Table 5 -
though the standard error is also larger. In column 3, I control additionally for the lagged
migrant shift-share µˆrt−1. This picks up part of the negative impact of λˆ
F
rt, though the
coefficient on λˆFrt remains close to -1. Columns 4-5 assess the effect of replacing the de-
pendent variable with its lag (as a test for pre-trends), based on the restricted 1970-2010
sample. As one would expect, the coefficient on µˆrt−1 in column 5 now becomes much
larger (and more negative), though there is also a large positive effect of λˆFrt. The latter
point suggests some difficulty in disentangling the effects of the current and lagged mi-
grant shift-shares in the state-level data, though any bias arising from pre-trends appears
to go against my crowding out hypothesis.
The associated first stage estimates are presented in columns 6-8: the current migrant
shift-share µˆrt is a strong instrument for λˆ
F
rt in every specification.
F Impact of foreign inflows on other CZ outcomes
F.1 Education composition
In Section 5, I estimate the impact of foreign inflows (elicited by the migrant shift-share
instrument) on two aggregate CZ-level outcomes: population and employment rates.
The purpose of this appendix is to explore heterogeneity across demographic groups
(specifically education) and also to assess additional outcomes (wages and housing costs).
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I begin by studying the impact of foreign inflows on local education composition. To
this end, I replace the dependent variable of (35) with education group s population
changes (I use s for “skill”, for consistency with the notation in Section 6), but keeping
the right hand side identical:
∆lsrt = δ0s + δ1sλˆ
F
rt + δ2sbrt + δ3s (n˜rt−1 − lrt−1) + ArtδAs + εsrt (A46)
Note that this specification estimates the education-specific outcomes of aggregate-level
shocks (the “pure spatial” approach in Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler, 2016), in
contrast to equation (37) in Section 6 which exploits variation in shocks within CZs (the
“mixture approach”). There are two endogenous variables (the foreign inflows and lagged
employment rate), and I instrument these with the migrant shift-share and lagged Bartik
- as in Section 5.
The top row of Table A9 reports IV estimates of δ1s in (A46), estimated for all
individuals (aged 16-64) and separately for different education groups. And in the next
two rows, I disaggregate the change in education-specific population into its foreign and
residual contributions: that is, I re-estimate δ1s after replacing ∆lsrt in (A46) with λˆ
F
srt
and λˆIsrt respectively, as defined by equations (38) and (39) in the main text.
It is useful to begin with the second row. The coefficient in the first column is 1 by
construction: the left hand and right hand side variables are identical. But the coefficients
are also close to 1 in the next two columns: 0.82 for college graduates and 1.03 for
non-graduates. Thus, the migrant shift-share instrument µˆrt attracts an educationally
balanced group of new foreign migrants (in terms of the graduate share), relative to the
existing local population. The third row shows the residual contribution’s response is
negative and a little larger in each case. As a result, the response of local graduate
and non-graduate populations are both small and slightly negative (-0.26 and -0.15), so
the graduate share is little affected. Having said that, to the extent that new migrants
downgrade in occupation and that undercoverage is disproportionate among low educated
migrants, this may understate the labor market pressure on low educated natives.
The remaining columns study finer education groups. Among the non-graduate stock,
inflows bring an expansion of the local share of high school dropouts. The importance of
this for local outcomes will depend on the substitutability between high school dropouts
and graduates in production.36 It is also worth emphasizing (as I do in Section 6) that
education-specific residual contributions may reflect changes in the characteristics of local
birth cohorts and not just geographical mobility.
36See the debate between e.g. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2012).
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F.2 Raw employment rates
In Panel B of Table A9, I replace the dependent variable of (A46) with the change
in raw native and migrant employment rates, i.e. without adjusting for demographic
composition.37 Again, the first column presents estimates for the full sample of individuals
(not disaggregated by education): -0.22 and -0.20 for natives and migrants respectively.
These are very similar to the effects on the composition-adjusted rates (-0.21 and -0.24):
see columns 1 and 6 of Table 8. This should be reassuring: given that adjusting local
employment rates for observable characteristics makes little difference, one may be less
concerned about the influence of unobservables.
The impact largely falls on lower educated individuals: for natives in particular, there
is no effect on those with college degrees. This suggests the minimal effect of foreign
inflows on the college graduate share (see first row of Table A9) may indeed understate
the labor market pressure on the low educated. Given this, it is perhaps surprising
that the residual response λˆIsrt is similarly large across all education groups (third row).
One explanation is demographic disparities in the speed of local population adjustments:
see e.g. Bound and Holzer (2000); Wozniak (2010); Notowidigdo (2011). In particular,
using the same data as this paper, Amior and Manning (2018) show that the college
graduate population adjusts fully to local employment shocks within one decade; and
any sluggishness in the population response is due to lower educated individuals.
F.3 Wages and housing costs
The remaining rows of Table A9 explore the impact of foreign inflows on local wages and
housing costs. Given the (moderate) adverse effect on local employment rates, one would
expect a small negative effect on real consumption wages - based on the labor supply
relationship in equation (2). Unfortunately, local wage deflators are notoriously difficult
to construct (and typically rely on strong theoretical assumptions), especially for the
detailed geographies and long time series in my data: see e.g. Koo, Phillips and Sigalla
(2000), Albouy (2008) and Phillips and Daly (2010). Nevertheless, one can at least study
the effects on nominal wages and housing costs separately.
In line with Amior and Manning (2018), I use residualized indices of wages, housing
rents and housing prices. I compute hourly wages as the ratio of annual labor earnings to
the product of weeks worked and usual hours per week in the census and ACS microdata.
I restrict my wage sample to employees aged 16-64, excluding those in group quarters;
and I also exclude wage observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles within
each geographical unit in the microdata.38 For each census cross-section, I then regress
37In notation, I estimate the impact on ∆ (nrt − lrt) rather than ∆ (n˜rt − lrt).
38See footnote 28 above.
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log hourly wages on a rich set of demographic controls39, and I compute the mean residual
within each geographical unit (for the nativity/education group of interest). I then impute
CZ-level wages by taking weighted averages across these units, using the population
weights described in Section B.1.
My housing sample consists of houses and apartments; I exclude farms, units with
over 10 acres of land, and units with commercial use. To construct the rental index, I
regress the monthly rents of privately rented units on a rich set of housing characteris-
tics40 (restricting attention to prices between the 1st and 99th percentiles, within each
geographical unit, from the sample), separately for each census cross-section. And I com-
pute the local mean of the residuals within each geographical unit. I residualize local
housing prices in the same way, though the sample is now restricted to owner-occupied
units. As with wages, I impute CZ-level housing cost measures by taking weighted av-
erages across the geographical units available in each microdata sample, again applying
the population weights from Section B.1.
In Panel C, I replace the dependent variable of (A46) with changes in the log resid-
ualized wage. Looking at the first column (covering the full sample), the impact on
native and migrant wages is close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, this
masks some heterogeneity: there is a small positive response for college graduates (an
elasticities of 0.17 for natives) and a smaller negative (but insignificant) effect among
the low educated. It is also worth noting that Card (2009b) and Gould (forthcoming)
identify positive effects of foreign inflows on local within-group wage inequality. On the
other hand, given the adverse effect on local employment rates, the wage effects among
non-graduates are perhaps difficult to interpret. It may be that the lowest paid workers
are selecting out of employment: see e.g. Card (2001) and Bratsberg and Raaum (2012).
Turning to housing costs, there is a positive but statistically insignificant effect on
both rents and prices (Panels D and E) for the full sample (column 1), with elasticities of
0.11 and 0.32 respectively. See also Saiz (2007), who finds positive effects of immigration
on local housing costs in the US. But to the extent that housing units are not perfect
substitutes within CZs (e.g. due to particular characteristics or neighborhoods), this
may mask part of the story. For example, Albouy and Zabek (2016) have recently doc-
umented growing inequality in housing prices within cities, driven mostly by changes in
the relative value of locations. This also relates to the “superstar city” story of Gyourko,
Mayer and Sinai (2013). To study this further, I compute the mean of local housing cost
residuals within native/migrant and education groups. Specifically, I define a household’s
39These are the same controls I use for adjusting local employment rates: age, age squared, five
education indicators, black/Asian/Hispanic indicators, gender, foreign-born status, and where available,
years in US and its square for migrants, together with a rich set of interactions. See Appendix B.2.
40Specifically, number of rooms (9 indicators) and bedrooms (6 indicators); an interaction between
number of rooms and bedrooms; building age (up to 9 indicators, depending on cross-section), presence
of kitchen, complete plumbing and condominium status; I also control for a house/apartment dummy,
together with interactions between this and all previously-mentioned variables.
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education as that of its most educated member; and I define a household as a “migrant
household” if at least one of its members was born abroad. It turns out that the positive
response of local housing costs is mostly driven by better educated households: the elas-
ticities of rents and prices for college graduate households (column 2) are 0.26 and 0.63
respectively (and both are statistically significant). Of course, this may simply reflect an
improvement in these households’ housing characteristics (on unobservable dimensions),
but it may also reflect increasing prices of housing characteristics disproportionately con-
sumed by these households. To the extent the latter interpretation is true, one may not
be able to conclude that real consumption wages have grown for this group41 - despite
the improvement in nominal wages. And this would be consistent with the negligible
effect on college graduate employment rates. As an aside, the question here is somewhat
analogous to that posed by Moretti (2013) regarding variation across MSAs. He finds
that college graduates are increasingly concentrating in more costly cities, but the wel-
fare implications depend on whether they are doing so because of labor demand shocks
or preferences for unobserved local amenities.
Certainly, an analysis of the impact on real consumption wages is challenging - and
not least because it is difficult to construct credible local wage deflators. This underscores
the potential advantages of relying on changes in local employment rates, based on the
sufficient statistic result of Amior and Manning (2018).
G Cohort effects in within-area estimates
The difference between the pooled cross-section and longitudinal estimates in Section 6.2
is suggestive of large cohort effects, though perhaps not conclusively so. For example,
it could be that the disparity is driven by events in the initial five years of each decade
(excluded from the longitudinal sample).
In Table A10, I test for cohort effects more explicitly by exploiting information in the
census on natives’ state of birth. As a reference, the first three columns present again the
CZ-level pooled cross-section estimates of δw1 in equation (37), identical to Table 9 in the
main text. Columns 4-6 then offer state-level estimates of δw1 , again using pooled cross-
sections. My sample consists of 49 geographical units (the 48 states of the continental
US plus the District of Columbia) and three decadal observations (over 1970-2000, for
comparability with the estimates in Table 9). As with the CZ estimates, the first stage
(using the education-specific migrant shift-share instrument µˆsrt) has substantial power
for all education delineations. And the IV estimates of the native-only response (column
5) look very similar to the comparable estimates for CZs (column 3).
41This depends of course on the importance of housing rents and prices in local wage deflators: see
e.g. Albouy (2008) and Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011).
63
Recall the dependent variable in column 5, λˆI,Nsrt , is the contribution of natives to
“skill” (in practice, education) s population growth among state r residents. In column
6, I now replace this with λˆI,NBPsrt: the contribution of natives to skill s population growth
among those born (rather than residing) in state r. The column 6 estimate should now
proxy for the contribution of cohort effects to education composition in state r - though
given that one third of individuals live outside their state of birth, it should understate
any such effects. Remarkably, the effects are all larger than the state of residence estimate
in column 5 - and for the first two delineations, substantially so. In other words, foreign
inflows to a given state exert a larger impact on the education composition of natives
born in that state than on those residing in it. This suggests any contribution of internal
mobility to the δw1 estimate in column 5 is more than fully offset by cohort effects.
H Reconciliation with Cadena and Kovak (2016)
H.1 Summary
In important work, Cadena and Kovak (2016) study the contribution of (specifically
Mexican) migrants to local labor market adjustment, exploiting variation in historical
settlement patterns. My paper builds on their contribution and implements a similar
identification strategy. But their results appear to diverge from mine in three ways.
First, Cadena and Kovak find that low educated natives contribute negligibly to local
adjustment - in contrast to Mexican-born workers. Second, they find that Mexicans
respond heavily even after arriving in the US - while in my paper, the migrant response
is entirely driven by new arrivals. And third, they find that Mexicans do not “crowd out”
the native population response, but rather, smooth local fluctuations in employment rates.
Based on the intuition from my model, notice that the final claim follows theoretically
from the first: migrants “grease the wheels” because the wheels are not already greased.
There are some important differences in empirical setting. Cadena and Kovak focus
on the contribution of specifically Mexican-born migrants between 2006 and 2010 (during
the Great Recession) across 94 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).42 And they find
that Mexicans accelerate local adjustment specifically in the low skilled market (less than
college): college-educated natives do respond strongly to local demand. In contrast, my
focus is the overall contribution of all migrants to the aggregate labor market over a
broader period: 1960-2010.
Nevertheless, I show here that there are also differences in empirical specification
between our papers which can help bridge the gap. In what follows, I focus specifically
42Attention is restricted to MSAs with adult population exceeding 100,000, Mexican-born sample
exceeding 60, and non-zero samples for all other studied demographic groups.
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on the elasticities of the native and migrant populations. Once I account for dynamics,
I find that the native population does respond strongly to local shocks.
H.2 Empirical model
Cadena and Kovak base their main analysis on the following specification:
∆lgr = ω0g + ω1gIndShockgr +XrωXg + εgr (A47)
See equation (1) of their paper, though I have altered notation to match my own. The
equation is estimated separately for nativity groups g: natives, Mexican migrants and
non-Mexican migrants. The dependent variable ∆lgr is the 2006-10 change in log local
population in a given nativity group, and IndShockgr is the contemporaneous within-
industry employment shock experienced by that group. This is the weighted average of
industry-specific employment changes:
IndShockgr ≡
∑
i
φigr∆nir (A48)
where the weights φigr are initial group-specific shares of local workers employed in in-
dustry i. I focus specifically on their Table 4: there, Cadena and Kovak instrument
IndShockgrt using a contemporaneous Bartik industry shift-share (common to all nativ-
ity groups), akin to that described in equation (31) in the main text. The coefficient
ω1g is interpreted as the group-specific elasticity of population to a local group-specific
demand shock. Two right-hand side controls are included in the vector Xr: the Mexican
population share in 2000 and indicators for MSAs in states that enacted anti-migrant
employment legislation. Like Cadena and Kovak, I weight all estimates using inverse
sample variances.
Notice the conceptual framework here is somewhat different to mine. My approach
is to study the overall population response to an aggregate-level shock, and I disaggre-
gate this response into the contributions from various groups (new migrants, natives, old
migrants). In contrast, equation (A47) estimates the elasticity of group-specific popula-
tion stocks to group-specific employment shocks. Cadena and Kovak estimate that ω1g is
statistically insignificant for low educated natives, but large and positive for equivalently
educated Mexican-born individuals. Given this, they argue that the aggregate low skilled
population will respond more strongly to a given employment shock in cities with larger
initial Mexican enclaves; and therefore, these cities will suffer weaker fluctuations in local
employment rates.
Beyond this broad conceptual point, there are also some differences in the empiri-
cal details. First, (A47) studies the response to a within-industry employment shock
IndShockgr, rather than a change in overall employment ∆ngr which accounts addi-
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tionally for between-industry shifts. Second, (A47) does not account for dynamics: in
particular, it does not control for the lagged employment rate. In principle, these dynam-
ics may be more consequential for the short 2006-2010 interval than the decadal intervals
in my own analysis. And third, Cadena and Kovak do not control for local amenity effects
such as climate.
H.3 Estimates
I explore the implications of these three specification features in Table A11, relying on
data and programs published alongside Cadena and Kovak’s article. I restrict attention
to low skilled workers (and specifically men) - who account for Cadena and Kovak’s
headline results. Columns 1-4 of Panel A of Table A11 replicate Panel A of Table 4 in
their paper. The response of low skilled natives to local demand shocks is negligible, while
the Mexican-born population responds heavily (with a one-for-one effect). The response
of non-Mexican migrants is large and negative, offsetting much of the Mexican response.
The overall population response (column 1) is positive but statistically insignificant.
In Panel B, I replace the within-industry employment shock IndShockgr with a simple
change in (group-specific) log employment ∆ngr. The estimates are mostly unchanged,
except we now see a large positive response from non-Mexican migrants.
In Panel C, I control additionally for the lagged group-specific employment rate (i.e.
in 2006), which I instrument using a Bartik industry shift-share for 2000-6.43 The speci-
fication now has the form of an error correction model, regressing the change in (group-
specific) log population on the change in (group-specific) log employment and the lagged
(group-specific) log employment rate. The responses from the overall population (column
1)
and natives (column 2) are now substantially larger - and it is not possible to statisti-
cally reject complete adjustment (i.e. coefficients of 1) over the period. Interestingly, the
native response now exceeds the overall population response - though the difference is
not statistically significant. The impact of controlling for dynamics is intuitive. As Ca-
dena and Kovak note, MSAs experiencing larger upturns before 2006 experienced larger
downturns thereafter. Thus, the small native response in the first row of Table A11 may
reflect a mixture between a (somewhat sluggish) response to a historic upturn and a
contemporaneous downturn.
The fit in columns 1 and 2 of Panel C appears remarkably good, given the small
sample of 94 MSAs - though this comes with the caveat of weak instruments. I report
the associated first stage estimates in Panels D and E, for the employment change and
43Cadena and Kovak construct this lagged Bartik for some robustness exercises in their own paper, so
I take it from their dataset.
66
lagged employment rate respectively. In columns 1 and 2, each instrument has a strong
positive effect (with a small standard error) on its corresponding endogenous variable
- and no positive effect on the other. However, the Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) F-
statistics (which account for multiple endogenous variables) are small: between 5 and 6
in each case. Identification is especially weak in columns 3 and 4 (Mexicans and other
migrants respectively), with F-statistics below 1; and furthermore, the instruments have
counterintuitive effects in these specifications.
In columns 5-8, I repeat the same regressions but controlling for the local amenity
effects described in Section 3 in the main text (using population allocations to map
CZ data to MSAs): climate, coastline, historical population and isolation. In Panel
A (without the dynamics), there is now a small positive response from natives. And
as before, the native response becomes larger once I control for dynamics, though the
standard errors are also much larger (and the first stage F-statistics much smaller).
I Reconciliation with Card (2001)
The seminal reference in the geographical crowding out literature is Card (2001). He
offers within-area estimates of crowding out, i.e. δw1 in (37), but exploiting longitudinal
residential information in the US census (respondents were asked where they lived five
years previously: see Section 6.2). This approach should address possible concerns about
cohort effects, but he still estimates a positive value for δw1 - with each new foreign migrant
to an area-skill cell attracting (on net) 0.25 additional residents. This appears to conflict
with my own longitudinal estimates in column 5 of Table 9 in the main text. In this
appendix, I attempt to reconcile my results with his. It appears the divergence of our
estimates is mostly explained by the choice of right hand side controls and the sample of
geographical areas.
I begin my attempting to replicate Card’s results. In line with his paper, I study
variation across the 175 largest MSAs in the 5 percent census extract of 1990.44 The
sample is restricted to individuals aged 16 to 68 with more than one year of potential ex-
perience. In constructing his sample, Card uses all foreign-born individuals in the census
extract and a 25 percent random sample of the native-born. I instead use the full sample
of natives, and this may (at least partly) account for some small discrepancies between
his estimates and my replication. Card delineates six skill groups by probabilistically
assigning individuals into broad occupation categories (laborers and low skilled services;
operative and craft; clerical; sales; managers; professional and technical), conditional
44The 1990 census microdata includes sub-state geographical identifiers known as Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs), and a concordance between PUMAs and MSAs can be found at:
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/puma.shtml. A number of PUMAs straddle MSA boundaries; and fol-
lowing Card, I allocate the population of a given PUMA to an MSA if at least half that PUMA’s
population resides in the MSA.
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on their education and demographic characteristics. This assignment is based on predic-
tions from a multinomial logit model, estimated separately for native men, native women,
migrant men and migrant women; and I follow the procedure set out in his appendix.
This approach offers the advantage of accounting for any occupational downgrading of
migrants (see e.g. Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler, 2016).
Card estimates a specification very similar to (37), except he uses first order approx-
imations of λˆIsrt and λˆ
F
srt. Specifically:
(
Lsr,1990 − L
F
sr,1990
)
− Lsr,1985
Lsr,1985
= δw0 + δ
w
1
LFsr,1990
Lsr,1985
+Xsrδ
w
X + ds + dr + εsr (A49)
where Lsr,1990 is the population of skill group s in area r in the census year (1990); Lsr,1985
is the local population five years previously, based on responses to the 1990 census; and
LFsr,1990 is the number of foreign migrants in the skill-area cell in 1990 who were living
abroad in 1985. Thus, the dependent variable is the contribution of natives and earlier
(pre-1985) migrants to population growth (net of emigrants from the US, who do not
appear in the sample), and the regressor
LFsr,1990
Lsr,1985
is the contribution of foreign migration
to that growth. To be more precise, Card actually uses the total (within-cell) population
growth Lsr,1990−Lsr,1985
Lsr,1985
as the dependent variable, but this is a cosmetic difference: it
simply adds a value of 1 to the δw1 coefficient.
45 Xsr is a vector of mean characteristics of
individuals in the (s, r) cell: these consist of mean age, mean age squared, mean years
of schooling and fraction black, separately for both natives and migrants in the cell, and
(for migrants only) mean years in the US. Finally, ds and dr are full sets of skill and area
fixed effects respectively.
The instrument for
LFsr,1990
Lsr,1985
is a first order approximation of (41) in the main text,
specifically
∑
o
φor,1985L
F
os,1990
Lsr,1985
, where φor,1985 is the share of origin o migrants who lived in
area r in 1985, and LFos,1990 is the number of new origin o migrants who arrived in the US
between 1985 and 1990. I use the 17 origin country groups described by Card.
In his baseline OLS specification (with 175 MSAs and observations weighted by cell
population), Card estimates δw1 as 0.25, with a standard error of 0.04: i.e. a “negative
crowding out” effect.46 And Card’s IV estimate is also 0.25, but with a standard error of
0.05. I record these estimates in column 1 of Table A12.
I attempt to replicate these estimates in column 2 and achieve similar numbers for
Card’s six-group occupation scheme (bottom row). In the remaining rows, I re-estimate
45See Peri and Sparber (2011) for a discussion of this point.
46Using his population growth dependent variable, this comes out as 1.25 - from which I subtract 1.
See final column of Table 4 of Card (2001).
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the model for the four education delineations from Table 9 in the main text: (i) college
graduates / non-graduates; (ii) at least one year of college / no college; (iii) high school
dropouts / all others; (iv) four groups: dropouts, high school graduates, some college
and college graduates. In the fifth row, I also study a classification with two imputed
occupation groups: all those two-digit occupations with less than 40 percent college share
in 1990, versus all those with more than 40 percent.47 I assign individuals probabilistically
to these groups using the same multinomial logit procedure (conditioning on the same
demographic characteristics) as for Card’s six group delineation in the final row. Looking
at column 2, it appears that the choice of skill delineation makes no significant difference
to the estimates. In column 3, I cluster the errors by state: the standard errors are now
larger, but the difference is not dramatic.
Much of the action comes in column 4, when I exclude the mean demographic controls
in Xsr from the right hand side. All the estimates of δ
w
1 are now negative, and they
are statistically significant for the college graduate, college and two-group occupation
schemes, with IV coefficients of -2.14, -0.45 and -0.47 respectively. Of course, these
controls may be picking up important skill-specific shocks which I have neglected: the
purpose of this exercise is merely to understand how our results can be reconciled.
Column 5 extends the geographical sample to all identifiable MSAs (raising the total
from 175 to 320), and column 6 extends it to cover 49 additional regions consisting of the
non-metro areas in each state48 (so 369 areas in total). The latter modification ensures
the area sample is comprehensive of the US, similarly to the CZs I use in the main text.
There may be good reason to exclude the smaller CZs; but again, the purpose of this
exercise is merely to reconcile our results. These sample extensions make the coefficients
larger (more negative) for all skill delineations, and the IV estimates in column 6 are now
statistically significant for all but the four-group education delineation.
In the final column, I replace the left and right hand side variables with λˆIsr,1990 and
λˆFsr,1990 respectively, as defined by equations (38) and (39): i.e. log
(
Lsr,1990−L
F
sr,1990
Lsr,1985
)
and
log
(
Lsr,1985+LFsr,1990
Lsr,1985
)
. This makes a negligible difference to the results. The final column
can now be compared to my longitudinal estimates in the main text (column 5 of Table 9):
the results look similar. Just as with the education groups, moving to a finer occupation
classification (i.e. from the penultimate to the final row) yields a smaller δw1 estimate;
the discussion in Section 6.2 offers an intuition for this result.
47As it happens, the occupational distribution in college share is strongly bipolar, and 40 percent is
the natural dividing line.
48Based on the allocation procedure described above, all of New Jersey is already classified as part of
an MSA. The “49 additional regions” cover the remaining 49 states.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Average contributions to local population adjustment
OLS IV
Aggregate Foreign Residual Aggregate Foreign Residual
response contribution contribution response contribution contribution
∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt ∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: No µˆrt control
∆ log emp 0.857*** 0.050*** 0.838*** 0.781*** 0.748*** 0.237** 0.527*** 0.571***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.043) (0.093) (0.090) (0.054)
Lagged log ER 0.246*** 0.089* 0.172*** 0.131*** 0.551*** 0.313*** 0.270* 0.258**
(0.020) (0.052) (0.053) (0.040) (0.097) (0.119) (0.150) (0.110)
Panel B: Controlling for µˆrt
∆ log emp 0.858*** 0.056*** 0.833*** 0.778*** 0.735*** 0.130*** 0.624*** 0.629***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.040) (0.039) (0.049) (0.042)
Lagged log ER 0.243*** 0.068*** 0.191*** 0.142*** 0.530*** 0.126* 0.441*** 0.360***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030) (0.096) (0.065) (0.123) (0.096)
µˆrt 0.133*** 0.955*** -0.847*** -0.498*** 0.110* 0.952*** -0.870*** -0.517***
(0.040) (0.085) (0.099) (0.065) (0.060) (0.085) (0.108) (0.082)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports OLS and IV estimates of β1 and β2 in (33), across 722 CZs and five (decadal) time periods, for different dependent variables:
first, the aggregate change in log population, and then its (approximate) components. All specifications control for year effects and the amenity
variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section 3.4. Panel B controls additionally for the local migrant shift-share, µˆrt. Errors are
clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2: First stage for estimates of average and heterogeneous contributions
First stage for Table 1 First stage for Table 3
∆ log emp Lagged ∆ log emp Lagged ∆ log emp ∆ log emp Lagged Lagged log
log ER log ER * λˆFrt log ER ER * λˆ
F
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current Bartik 0.823*** -0.135* 0.839*** -0.134* 0.993*** -0.007 -0.175*** 0.004
(0.130) (0.072) (0.124) (0.069) (0.123) (0.006) (0.065) (0.003)
Current Bartik * µˆrt -4.543 1.302*** 1.440 -0.556***
(3.110) (0.173) (1.025) (0.074)
Lagged Bartik 0.102 0.369*** 0.122* 0.371*** 0.095* 0.012*** 0.337*** -0.004**
(0.068) (0.061) (0.068) (0.063) (0.056) (0.002) (0.061) (0.002)
Lagged Bartik * µˆrt 0.928 -0.245** -0.434 0.446***
(2.038) (0.106) (1.416) (0.095)
µˆrt -0.233** -0.022 -2.429 -0.216* -0.691 -0.900***
(0.113) (0.122) (2.012) (0.111) (1.815) (0.167)
SW F-stat 74.65 55.46 78.91 56.41 111.24 22.84 54.94 15.91
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amenity×µˆrt controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table presents first stage estimates corresponding to the IV specifications in Tables 1 and 3. The Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) F-
statistics account for multiple endogenous variables. All specifications control for year effects, the amenity variables described in Section 3.4
and interactions between the two. The first stages for the Table 3 specifications control additionally for interactions between the amenity
variables and local migrant intensity. I have marked in bold the effect of each instrument on its corresponding endogenous variable, i.e. where
one should theoretically expect to see positive effects. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Heterogeneity in contributions to population adjustment
OLS IV
Aggregate Foreign Residual Aggregate Foreign Residual
response contribution contribution response contribution contribution
∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt ∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ log emp 0.852*** 0.004 0.859*** 0.852*** 0.791*** -0.006 0.809*** 0.825***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.036) (0.028) (0.046) (0.043)
∆ log emp * µˆrt 0.169 1.930*** -1.030*** -2.877*** -0.689 4.908*** -5.326*** -8.410***
(0.247) (0.376) (0.379) (0.515) (0.804) (1.180) (1.127) (1.325)
Lagged log ER 0.224*** 0.021 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.560*** 0.007 0.595*** 0.579***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.114) (0.055) (0.131) (0.126)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 1.842*** 1.757*** 0.501 -2.384*** 1.693 7.407*** -6.551*** -11.857***
(0.653) (0.647) (0.535) (0.377) (1.938) (2.203) (2.482) (3.542)
µˆrt 1.491 1.441 -0.029 -0.428 1.536 6.062* -5.681** -8.042**
(1.118) (1.289) (0.838) (0.708) (2.449) (3.220) (2.594) (3.805)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amenity×µˆrt controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports OLS and IV estimates of equation (34), across 722 CZs and five (decadal) time periods. As in Table 1, I estimate this equation
for the change in log population and its (approximate) components. All specifications control for year effects, the amenity variables described in
Section in Section 3.4, interactions between the amenity variables and year effects, and (unlike Table 1) interactions between the amenity variables
and local migrant intensity. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by
the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Evolution of local employment rates (IV estimates)
All Natives Migrants All Natives Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log emp 0.252*** 0.251*** 0.167* 0.209*** 0.200*** 0.193**
(0.043) (0.045) (0.098) (0.036) (0.038) (0.089)
∆ log emp * µˆrt 0.689 1.159 -1.551
(0.804) (0.773) (1.502)
Lagged log ER -0.551*** -0.560*** -0.609*** -0.560*** -0.577*** -0.577**
(0.097) (0.099) (0.216) (0.114) (0.119) (0.253)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt -1.693 -1.168 -2.405
(1.938) (1.772) (4.192)
µˆrt -1.536 -1.472 -0.952
(2.449) (2.208) (4.371)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amenity×µˆrt controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,599 3,610 3,610 3,599
Columns 1-3 replicate the IV estimate of column 5 of Table 1 (Panel A), but replacing the dependent
variable with changes in log (composition-adjusted) employment rates: separately for all individuals,
natives and migrants. Columns 4-6 do the same for the IV estimate of column 5 of Table 3. The
observation count is a little smaller in columns 3 and 6: I am unable to compute composition-adjusted
migrant employment rates for 11 small CZs in the 1960s (see footnote 18). Errors are clustered by state,
and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local
population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Estimates of crowding out across CZs
Basic crowding out estimates Cond. on emp Emp response
λˆIrt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt−1 λˆ
I
rt ∆n˜rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign contrib: λˆFrt -0.761*** -1.096*** -1.109*** -0.787*** -0.786*** -0.235 -0.913*** -0.245**
(0.200) (0.130) (0.153) (0.167) (0.184) (0.228) (0.065) (0.102)
∆ log emp 0.743***
(0.043)
Lagged log ER 0.520*** 0.831*** 0.833*** 0.556*** 0.370*
(0.072) (0.207) (0.221) (0.105) (0.191)
Current Bartik 0.646*** 0.677*** 0.679*** 0.524*** 0.421*** -0.071 0.911***
(0.109) (0.099) (0.096) (0.119) (0.161) (0.168) (0.103)
Lagged Bartik 0.290*** 0.287*** 0.907***
(0.060) (0.085) (0.103)
µˆrt−1 0.016 -0.388*** -0.340*** -0.984***
(0.161) (0.124) (0.116) (0.167)
Specification OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Instruments - µˆrt, brt−1 µˆrt, brt−1 µˆrt µˆrt µˆrt µˆrt, brt, brt−1 µˆrt, brt−1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 70-10 70-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,888 2,888 3,610 3,610
Columns 1-6 report variants of the crowding out equation (35). There are (up to) two endogenous variables: the contribution of new migrants
to local population growth, λˆFrt, and the lagged log employment rate. The corresponding instruments are the migrant shift-share µˆrt and the
lagged Bartik brt−1. Columns 5-6 exclude observations from the 1960s, and column 6 replaces the dependent variable with its lag. Column
7 reports estimates of equation (36), which replaces the current Bartik control with the current change in log employment (with the current
Bartik brt deployed instead as a third instrument). Column 8 re-estimates column 2, but replacing the dependent variable with the change
in the log employment stock. All specifications control for year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects) described in
Section 3.4. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged
local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: First stage for crowding out estimates
Foreign contribution: λˆFrt Lagged log ER ∆ log emp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current Bartik 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.121*** -0.134* -0.156** 0.839***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.069) (0.067) (0.124)
Lagged Bartik 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.160*** 0.371*** 0.373*** 0.122*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.063) (0.062) (0.068)
µˆrt 0.919*** 1.229*** 1.173*** -0.022 0.475*** -0.233**
(0.084) (0.119) (0.105) (0.122) (0.175) (0.113)
µˆrt−1 -0.399*** -0.377*** -0.640***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.139)
SW F-test: 2 endog vars 126.47 54.88 - 34.70 31.00 -
SW F-test: 3 endog vars 93.68 - - 56.93 - 84.09
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 70-10 60-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 2,888 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports first stage estimates corresponding to the crowding out specifications in Table 5. I report
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics which account for multiple endogenous variables, both for those Table 5 spe-
cifications with two endogenous variables (i.e. λˆFrt and the lagged employment rate) and those with three (as before,
plus the current change in log employment). All specifications control for year effects and the amenity variables
(interacted with year effects) described in Section 3.4. I have marked in bold the effect of each instrument on its
corresponding endogenous variable, i.e. where one should theoretically expect to see positive effects. Errors are
clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the
lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Robustness of IV crowding out effects to controls and decadal sample
Natives and old migrants: λˆIrt Natives only: λˆ
I,N
rt
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All years All years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year effects 0.273 -0.726 -0.041 -0.943*** -0.538** -0.526** -0.224
(0.944) (0.635) (0.250) (0.225) (0.252) (0.246) (0.172)
+ Current Bartik -0.745 -0.268 -0.455 -0.921*** -0.572** -0.689*** -0.396**
(1.134) (0.466) (0.350) (0.260) (0.251) (0.217) (0.158)
+ Lagged log ER (instrumented) -0.709 -0.238 -0.744* -0.327 -0.564** -0.753*** -0.448**
(1.139) (0.318) (0.441) (0.421) (0.246) (0.239) (0.176)
+ Climate controls -1.967** -2.088*** -0.973*** -1.343*** -0.845*** -1.396*** -0.973***
(0.908) (0.467) (0.302) (0.256) (0.180) (0.192) (0.146)
+ Coastline dummy -2.032** -2.087*** -0.865** -1.119*** -0.637*** -1.263*** -0.846***
(0.947) (0.473) (0.350) (0.251) (0.189) (0.228) (0.172)
+ Log pop density 1900 -1.657*** -1.797*** -0.726*** -1.100*** -0.558*** -1.107*** -0.721***
(0.610) (0.220) (0.201) (0.276) (0.215) (0.256) (0.218)
+ Log distance to closest CZ -1.626** -1.917*** -0.877*** -1.203*** -0.638*** -1.137*** -0.751***
(0.634) (0.197) (0.188) (0.298) (0.236) (0.251) (0.215)
+ Amenity×yr effects -1.626** -1.917*** -0.877*** -1.203*** -0.638*** -1.096*** -0.715***
(0.634) (0.197) (0.188) (0.298) (0.236) (0.130) (0.127)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 3,610 3,610
This table tests the robustness of my IV crowding out estimate δ1 (in column 2 of Table 5) to the choice of controls and decadal sample.
Moving down the rows of the table, I show how my δ1 estimate changes as progressively more controls are included. All specifications include
the foreign contribution λˆFrt (instrumented with the migrant shift-share, µˆrt) and year effects. The second row controls additionally for a
current Bartik, brt; the third row includes the (endogenous) lagged employment rate (together with its lagged Bartik instrument, brt−1);
and the various amenities are then progressively added - until the final row, which includes the full set of controls I use in Table 5. The
first six columns report estimates of δ1, separately for each decade and for all decades together; and the final column replaces the dependent
variable with the contribution of natives alone, λˆI,Nrt . Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8: IV effects of foreign inflows on change in log employment rate
Native Migrant
Current Current Current Current Lagged Current
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign contrib: λˆFrt -0.210*** -0.190** -0.350*** -0.399*** -0.022 -0.236***
(0.057) (0.092) (0.075) (0.072) (0.061) (0.055)
Lagged log ER -0.411*** -0.414*** -0.469**
(0.087) (0.091) (0.204)
Current Bartik 0.259*** 0.255*** 0.333*** 0.483*** 0.024 0.192**
(0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.051) (0.058) (0.081)
Lagged Bartik -0.144*** -0.098*** 0.069*
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036)
µˆrt−1 -0.024 0.177** 0.201*** -0.216***
(0.079) (0.076) (0.073) (0.063)
Instruments µˆrt, brt−1 µˆrt, brt−1 µˆrt µˆrt µˆrt µˆrt, brt−1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 70-10 70-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,888 2,888 3,599
This table reports estimates of the crowding out equation (35), with the dependent variable replaced
with the change in the log (composition-adjusted) employment rate - either of natives or migrants. See
the notes under Table 5 for further details about the empirical specification, and see Table 6 for the
first stage estimates. All specifications control for year effects and the amenity variables (interacted
with year effects) described in Section 3.4. The observation count is a little smaller in column 6: I am
unable to compute composition-adjusted migrant employment rates for 11 small CZs in the 1960s (see
footnote 18). Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Within-area IV estimates of δw1
Pooled cross-sections Longitudinal Observations
First stage Full residual Natives First stage Full residual Natives
coefficient contrib: λˆIsrt only: λˆ
I,N
srt coefficient contrib: λˆ
I
srt only: λˆ
I,N
srt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG / < CG 0.539*** 1.502*** 1.638*** 0.475*** -3.587** -2.798** 4,332
(0.067) (0.295) (0.369) (0.074) (1.518) (1.244)
Coll / < Coll 0.662*** 1.040*** 1.046*** 0.778*** -1.129*** -0.794*** 4,332
(0.044) (0.132) (0.162) (0.056) (0.094) (0.140)
HSD / > HSD 0.785*** 0.980*** 1.410*** 0.841*** -0.425*** -0.252*** 4,332
(0.031) (0.088) (0.261) (0.039) (0.090) (0.067)
4 edu groups 0.744*** 1.330*** 1.521*** 0.817*** -0.194* -0.041 8,664
(0.035) (0.095) (0.209) (0.038) (0.117) (0.085)
This table reports within-area estimates of δw1 based on equation (37). The first three columns are based on pooled decadal
cross-sections between 1970 and 2000, and columns 4-6 exploit longitudinal information on changes in residence over 1975-1980,
1985-1990 and 1995-2000. Columns 1 and 4 report the first stage coefficients on the skill-specific migrant shift-share, µˆsrt. And
the remaining columns report IV estimates of δw1 , both for the full residual contribution (natives and old migrants) and for
natives only. The four rows offer estimates for different education-based skill delineations: (i) college graduates / non-graduates,
(ii) at least one year of college / no college, (iii) high school dropouts / all others, and (iv) four groups: high school dropouts,
high school graduates, some college and college graduates. All specifications control for both CZ-year and skill-year interacted
fixed effects. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted
by the lagged cell-specific population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A1: Robustness of IV contributions to local adjustment: Specification choices
Aggregate Foreign Residual Aggregate Foreign Residual
response contribution contribution response contribution contribution
∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt ∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Original specification
∆ log emp 0.748*** 0.237** 0.527*** 0.571*** 0.791*** -0.006 0.809*** 0.825***
(0.043) (0.093) (0.090) (0.054) (0.036) (0.028) (0.046) (0.043)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.689 4.908*** -5.326*** -8.410***
(0.804) (1.180) (1.127) (1.325)
Lagged log ER 0.551*** 0.313*** 0.270* 0.258** 0.560*** 0.007 0.595*** 0.579***
(0.097) (0.119) (0.150) (0.110) (0.114) (0.055) (0.131) (0.126)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 1.693 7.407*** -6.551*** -11.857***
(1.938) (2.203) (2.482) (3.542)
µˆrt 1.536 6.062* -5.681** -8.042**
(2.449) (3.220) (2.594) (3.805)
Panel B: Controlling for CZ fixed effects
∆ log emp 0.653*** -0.054** 0.727*** 0.650*** 0.719*** -0.014 0.728*** 0.723***
(0.058) (0.021) (0.059) (0.054) (0.049) (0.029) (0.046) (0.046)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -1.473* 2.882*** -4.013*** -7.052***
(0.806) (0.309) (0.814) (0.736)
Lagged log ER 1.178*** 0.185 1.033*** 0.852*** 0.997*** 0.356** 0.634** 0.410
(0.329) (0.229) (0.217) (0.245) (0.194) (0.150) (0.279) (0.363)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt -1.039 7.299*** -9.201*** -15.586***
(2.092) (2.133) (1.920) (2.849)
µˆrt 3.731 5.729** -3.035 -6.198*
(2.484) (2.546) (2.174) (3.535)
Panel C: Excluding lagged employment rate
∆ log emp 0.870*** 0.306*** 0.587*** 0.628*** 0.855*** 0.000 0.872*** 0.883***
(0.028) (0.076) (0.089) (0.057) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.468 3.175*** -3.127*** -4.982***
(0.396) (0.787) (0.643) (0.672)
µˆrt -0.148 -0.603 0.042 2.459***
(0.708) (0.541) (0.910) (0.680)
Panel D: Raw employment variables
∆ log emp 0.630*** 0.185** 0.457*** 0.499*** 0.680*** 0.013 0.672*** 0.674***
(0.039) (0.085) (0.097) (0.058) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.038)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.236 4.257*** -3.977*** -6.442***
(0.752) (1.403) (1.306) (1.405)
Lagged log ER 0.388*** 0.217*** 0.193* 0.185** 0.397*** -0.024 0.449*** 0.454***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.115) (0.086) (0.091) (0.043) (0.109) (0.105)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 2.328 6.291*** -4.309*** -8.509***
(2.012) (1.718) (1.526) (1.827)
µˆrt 2.489 5.403 -3.701* -5.378*
(3.449) (3.777) (2.134) (3.048)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amenity×µˆrt controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table replicates the IV estimates from columns 5-8 (Panel A) of Table 1 and columns 5-8 of Table 3, subject to various changes of specification.
Employment variables are composition-adjusted in all specifications except in Panel D. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Robustness of IV contributions to local adjustment: Amenity controls
Aggregate Foreign Residual Aggregate Foreign Residual
response contribution contribution response contribution contribution
∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt ∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Year effects only
∆ log emp 0.851*** 0.399* 0.468* 0.581*** 0.799*** 0.068 0.741*** 0.813***
(0.052) (0.229) (0.240) (0.092) (0.057) (0.114) (0.158) (0.127)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.616 7.248 -8.208 -11.165
(0.759) (8.017) (9.829) (9.260)
Lagged log ER 0.394*** 0.841** -0.426 -0.048 0.234*** 0.380 -0.138 0.007
(0.086) (0.428) (0.401) (0.185) (0.070) (0.362) (0.452) (0.390)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt -0.027 11.284 -13.054 -16.914
(1.237) (13.308) (15.582) (15.559)
µˆrt 0.306 4.477 -4.822 -5.700
(0.430) (4.388) (5.098) (5.111)
Panel B: ... + amenity * year interactions
∆ log emp 0.748*** 0.237** 0.527*** 0.571*** 0.752*** 0.027 0.738*** 0.782***
(0.043) (0.093) (0.090) (0.054) (0.039) (0.054) (0.067) (0.068)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.107 8.972 -9.258* -12.188**
(2.092) (5.796) (4.814) (5.079)
Lagged log ER 0.551*** 0.313*** 0.270* 0.258** 0.487*** -0.172 0.725*** 0.725***
(0.097) (0.119) (0.150) (0.110) (0.110) (0.277) (0.266) (0.256)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 2.174 16.061 -15.370* -19.784**
(4.261) (10.327) (8.908) (10.076)
µˆrt 0.989 6.239* -5.845* -6.888**
(1.478) (3.534) (3.034) (3.460)
Panel C: ... + amenity * µˆrt interactions
∆ log emp 0.753*** 0.093*** 0.686*** 0.658*** 0.791*** -0.006 0.809*** 0.825***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.051) (0.050) (0.036) (0.028) (0.046) (0.043)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.689 4.908*** -5.326*** -8.410***
(0.804) (1.180) (1.127) (1.325)
Lagged log ER 0.571*** 0.101** 0.509*** 0.416*** 0.560*** 0.007 0.595*** 0.579***
(0.112) (0.049) (0.125) (0.113) (0.114) (0.055) (0.131) (0.126)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 1.693 7.407*** -6.551*** -11.857***
(1.938) (2.203) (2.482) (3.542)
µˆrt 1.536 6.062* -5.681** -8.042**
(2.449) (3.220) (2.594) (3.805)
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table replicates the IV estimates from columns 5-8 (Panel A) of Table 1 and columns 5-8 of Table 3, subject to various combinations of right
hand side controls. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the
lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Robustness of IV contributions to local adjustment: Sample and weights
Aggregate Foreign Residual Aggregate Foreign Residual
response contribution contribution response contribution contribution
∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt ∆lrt λˆ
F
rt All: λˆ
I
rt Natives: λˆ
I,N
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Weighted + Excluding observations with µˆrt > 0.1 (N = 3,544; 88% of pop)
∆ log emp 0.761*** 0.265*** 0.510*** 0.575*** 0.834*** -0.044 0.898*** 0.913***
(0.043) (0.084) (0.085) (0.058) (0.053) (0.028) (0.070) (0.072)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -3.077 8.488** -12.478* -15.216**
(3.623) (3.714) (6.995) (7.545)
Lagged log ER 0.501*** 0.142 0.406*** 0.313*** 0.540*** -0.036 0.608*** 0.576***
(0.093) (0.116) (0.144) (0.113) (0.105) (0.062) (0.135) (0.139)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt -0.230 6.510* -7.763 -11.487
(3.367) (3.712) (7.486) (7.667)
µˆrt -1.157 6.894** -9.904 -10.971
(3.601) (2.921) (6.332) (6.795)
Panel B: Unweighted (N = 3,610; 100% of pop)
∆ log emp 0.759*** 0.098*** 0.677*** 0.686*** 0.780*** 0.016** 0.773*** 0.798***
(0.038) (0.017) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.007) (0.042) (0.042)
∆ log emp * µˆrt 1.607* 1.968*** 0.078 -4.457***
(0.854) (0.475) (1.097) (1.132)
Lagged log ER 0.444*** 0.129*** 0.333*** 0.315*** 0.455*** 0.029** 0.443*** 0.444***
(0.067) (0.031) (0.059) (0.060) (0.080) (0.013) (0.082) (0.074)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 4.565*** 3.592*** 1.091 -7.071***
(1.708) (0.783) (2.057) (1.908)
µˆrt -0.157 2.628*** -2.720 -4.598***
(1.682) (0.631) (1.742) (1.415)
Panel C: Unweighted + Excluding CZs with 1960 population of 16-64s < 25,000 (N = 2,425; 98% of pop)
∆ log emp 0.765*** 0.102*** 0.679*** 0.690*** 0.791*** 0.015*** 0.785*** 0.801***
(0.038) (0.019) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.006) (0.043) (0.042)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.001 1.989*** -1.570 -5.041***
(0.752) (0.501) (1.010) (1.209)
Lagged log ER 0.434*** 0.139*** 0.315*** 0.303*** 0.454*** 0.034*** 0.437*** 0.425***
(0.067) (0.034) (0.066) (0.066) (0.077) (0.013) (0.080) (0.076)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 1.699 4.171*** -2.456 -8.771***
(1.496) (0.618) (1.616) (1.478)
µˆrt 0.949 3.688*** -2.927 -4.789**
(1.944) (0.849) (1.906) (1.994)
Panel D: Unweighted + Excluding CZs with 1960 population of 16-64s < 50,000 (N = 1,675; 93% of pop)
∆ log emp 0.749*** 0.105*** 0.661*** 0.669*** 0.769*** 0.011 0.767*** 0.785***
(0.034) (0.023) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039) (0.008) (0.039) (0.039)
∆ log emp * µˆrt -0.335 2.257*** -2.143* -5.521***
(0.802) (0.598) (1.094) (1.376)
Lagged log ER 0.427*** 0.143*** 0.303*** 0.308*** 0.442*** 0.033** 0.425*** 0.421***
(0.052) (0.041) (0.051) (0.048) (0.054) (0.014) (0.058) (0.057)
Lagged log ER * µˆrt 0.875 5.051*** -4.108** -10.391***
(1.999) (0.866) (1.796) (1.791)
µˆrt 1.089 4.616*** -3.684*** -6.749***
(1.919) (1.463) (1.304) (1.404)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amenity×µˆrt controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table replicates the IV estimates from columns 5-8 (Panel A) of Table 1 and columns 5-8 of Table 3, subject to various weighting choices (i.e.
with or without lagged local population share weights) and sample choices. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4: Average foreign contributions by country/region of origin
Total foreign Mexico Other Latin Europe and Asia Other
contribution America former USSR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS
∆ log emp 0.050*** 0.020** 0.006 0.008*** 0.012* 0.007***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Lagged log ER 0.089* 0.012 0.033 0.015** 0.020* 0.011*
(0.052) (0.013) (0.037) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
IV
∆ log emp 0.237** -0.010 0.127*** 0.042*** 0.045** 0.041***
(0.093) (0.020) (0.047) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013)
Lagged log ER 0.313*** 0.089*** 0.094 0.033** 0.105** 0.009
(0.119) (0.034) (0.065) (0.014) (0.042) (0.014)
% foreign migration 100 26.9 23.8 14.6 26.6 8.1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table breaks down the foreign contributions in columns 2 and 6 (Panel A) of Table 1 into approximate
contributions from origin country groups. For each origin group o, I replace the dependent variable of
equation (33) with λˆFort ≡ log
(
Lrt−1+L
F o
rt
Lrt−1
)
. Otherwise, the specifications are identical to those in Table 1.
Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is
weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Estimates of crowding out across CZs: Alternative IV strategies
λˆIrt λˆ
I
rt
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
∆Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
∆Lrt − L
F
rt ∆Lrt − L
F
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Weighted estimates
λˆFrt -1.096*** -1.393*** -0.631 -1.351***
(0.130) (0.262) (0.611) (0.262)
LFrt
Lrt−1
-1.090*** -1.077***
(0.143) (0.163)
LFrt -0.228*** -0.971***
(0.085) (0.273)
Lagged log ER 0.831*** 0.943*** 0.893*** 0.888*** 2×106*** 4×106** 1.269**
(0.207) (0.172) (0.227) (0.203) (7×105) (2×106) (0.496)
Current Bartik 0.677*** 0.737*** 0.791*** 0.788*** 2×105 -2×105 0.615*** 0.580***
(0.099) (0.106) (0.116) (0.124) (3×105) (2×105) (0.086) (0.080)
Lagged Bartik 0.162***
(0.063)
µˆrt−1 0.078
(0.119)
SW F-stat for foreign contrib 126.47 40.26 116.05 91.63 262.07 92.07 58.33 40.30
SW F-stat for lagged ER 34.70 45.18 34.99 40.63 39.10 49.08 45.51 -
Panel B: Unweighted estimates
λˆFrt -0.940*** -1.538*** -2.288*** -2.400***
(0.266) (0.458) (0.448) (0.589)
LFrt
Lrt−1
-1.005*** -1.210***
(0.285) (0.293)
LFrt -0.147 -1.186***
(0.151) (0.273)
Lagged log ER 0.578*** 0.664*** 0.667*** 0.697*** 6×105*** 3×105*** 0.654***
(0.183) (0.188) (0.218) (0.227) (2×105) (1×105) (0.247)
Current Bartik 0.604*** 0.650*** 0.679*** 0.696*** 2×105*** -9×103 0.442*** 0.410***
(0.106) (0.115) (0.127) (0.130) (6×104) (3×104) (0.074) (0.070)
Lagged Bartik 0.117***
(0.042)
µˆrt−1 0.210
(0.166)
SW F-stat for foreign contrib 51.13 50.09 42.80 14.59 121.72 42.95 6.27 5.61
SW F-stat for lagged ER 25.77 32.27 26.03 25.61 30.32 52.55 53.13 -
Instruments µˆrt, brt−1 µˆ
60
rt , brt−1
ΛFrt
Lrt−1
, brt−1 Λ
F
rt, brt−1 Λ
F
rt, brt−1 Λ
F
rt, brt−1 µˆrt, brt−1 µˆrt, brt−1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CZ fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table offers alternative estimates of δ1 in equation (35), implementing different IV strategies and variable specifications. Panel A reports
estimates weighted by the lagged population share, and Panel B reports unweighted estimates. Columns 1-5 in each panel do not control for
CZ fixed effects, while columns 6-8 do. The dependent variable in each specification is reported in the field above the column number. The
instruments I use in each specification are reported at the bottom of the table. The Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) F- statistics account for
multiple endogenous variables. All specifications control for the lagged employment rate (always instrumented with the lagged Bartik brt−1),
the current Bartik brt, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section 3.4. Errors are clustered by
state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: Robustness of IV crowding out effects: Native response
Basic specification
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year effects 0.922 -0.695 0.033 -0.678*** 0.159 -0.224
(0.728) (0.520) (0.165) (0.174) (0.153) (0.172)
+ Current Bartik -0.139 -0.362 -0.405 -0.661*** 0.144 -0.396**
(0.891) (0.409) (0.261) (0.208) (0.155) (0.158)
+ Lagged log ER (instrumented) -0.116 -0.336 -0.636* -0.148 0.139 -0.448**
(0.896) (0.291) (0.355) (0.366) (0.151) (0.176)
+ Climate controls -1.193* -1.976*** -0.825*** -0.981*** -0.057 -0.973***
(0.716) (0.403) (0.224) (0.257) (0.141) (0.146)
+ Coastline dummy -1.250* -2.000*** -0.725*** -0.776*** 0.112 -0.846***
(0.736) (0.403) (0.273) (0.256) (0.163) (0.172)
+ Log pop density 1900 -0.942** -1.747*** -0.628*** -0.759*** 0.182 -0.721***
(0.454) (0.189) (0.183) (0.280) (0.186) (0.218)
+ Log distance to closest CZ -0.926* -1.873*** -0.751*** -0.870*** 0.101 -0.751***
(0.476) (0.190) (0.176) (0.302) (0.194) (0.215)
+ Amenities x year effects -0.926* -1.873*** -0.751*** -0.870*** 0.101 -0.715***
(0.476) (0.190) (0.176) (0.302) (0.194) (0.127)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 3,610
This table replicates the specifications from Table 7 in the main text, except replacing the dependent variable
(the full residual contribution, λˆIrt) with the contribution of natives alone, λˆ
I,N
rt . Note that column 6 in this
table is identical to column 7 of Table 7. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table A7: Contribution of inflows and outflows to crowding out across CZs
OLS IV
Net flow Inflow Outflow Net flows Inflow Outflow
λˆI5rt λˆ
Ii5
rt λˆ
Io5
rt λˆ
I5
rt λˆ
Ii5
rt λˆ
Io5
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign contrib: λˆF5rt -0.500 -0.296 0.147 -1.555*** -1.661*** -0.320
(0.319) (0.385) (0.152) (0.269) (0.388) (0.222)
Log ER lagged 10 yrs 0.199*** 0.162*** -0.016 0.556*** 0.758*** 0.285**
(0.047) (0.051) (0.033) (0.191) (0.179) (0.118)
Current decadal Bartik 0.286** 0.400*** 0.161*** 0.442*** 0.566*** 0.190***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.047) (0.115) (0.120) (0.067)
SW F-stat for foreign contrib - - - 88.92 88.92 88.92
SW F-stat for lagged ER - - - 26.37 26.37 26.37
Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166
This table offers OLS and IV estimates of the 5-year net crowding out effect, based on equation (A45),
and disaggregates these into the (approximate) contributions from internal inflows and outflows. Variable
definitions and data sources are given in Section E.4. The flow data covers the intervals 1965-70, 1975-80,
1985-90 and 1995-2000. The 5-year foreign contribution is instrumented with a 5-year migrant shift-share in
the IV specification, based on settlement patterns five years previously. The log employment rate, lagged ten
years (e.g. measured at 1960 for the 1965-70 flow interval), is instrumented using a lagged decadal Bartik. I
also control for a current decadal Bartik, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects)
described in Section 3.4. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the 5-year lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A8: State-level estimates of crowding out
OLS and IV First stage for foreign contrib
λˆIrt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt λˆ
I
rt−1 λˆ
F
rt λˆ
F
rt λˆ
F
rt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign contrib: λˆFrt -0.672** -1.294*** -0.949** -1.027** 0.804**
(0.251) (0.345) (0.379) (0.440) (0.324)
Current Bartik -0.024 0.204 0.136 0.090 -0.576* 0.097** 0.066 0.172**
(0.236) (0.236) (0.239) (0.359) (0.300) (0.037) (0.043) (0.069)
Lagged Bartik 0.185** 0.307*** 0.300*** 0.156 0.384** 0.063 0.076 0.165**
(0.088) (0.107) (0.105) (0.178) (0.152) (0.040) (0.051) (0.066)
µˆrt 1.069*** 1.403*** 1.287***
(0.068) (0.082) (0.091)
µˆrt−1 -0.469** -0.198 -2.246*** -0.424*** -0.424***
(0.223) (0.199) (0.320) (0.095) (0.081)
Specification OLS IV IV IV IV - - -
Corresponding IV spec - - - - - Col 2 Col 3 Cols 4-5
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 70-10 70-10 60-10 60-10 70-10
Observations 245 245 245 196 196 245 245 196
Columns 1-5 report state-level OLS and IV estimates of equation (35), though replacing the lagged employment rate with
the lagged Bartik on the right hand side. In the IV specifications, the foreign contribution λˆFrt is instrumented with a migrant
shift-share µˆrt. Columns 6-8 report the first stage estimates. In addition to the variables reported in the tables, all specifications
control for year effects and all the amenity variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section E.5. The full sample
consists of five decadal observations of 49 geographical units (the 48 states of the continental US plus the District of Columbia)
over five decadal periods. Columns 4-5 (and the corresponding first stage in column 8) omit the 1960-70 period. Errors are
clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged state
population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A9: IV effects of foreign inflows by education
All College Non- Postgrad Undergrad Some High-school High-school
individuals graduates graduates degree degree college graduates dropouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Population
∆ log pop -0.061 -0.261* -0.145 -0.338 -0.146 -0.805*** -0.368* 0.968***
(0.122) (0.159) (0.135) (0.240) (0.142) (0.270) (0.223) (0.158)
Foreign contrib 1 0.816*** 1.033*** 0.721*** 0.896*** 0.673*** 0.930*** 1.446***
(0.041) (0.011) (0.059) (0.049) (0.035) (0.027) (0.063)
Residual contrib -1.096*** -0.977*** -1.274*** -1.022*** -0.877*** -1.444*** -1.334*** -0.924***
(0.130) (0.184) (0.136) (0.272) (0.147) (0.257) (0.235) (0.154)
Panel B: Employment rates (raw)
∆ log native ER -0.222*** -0.023 -0.357*** 0.019 -0.033 -0.248*** -0.213*** -1.006***
(0.058) (0.020) (0.070) (0.015) (0.034) (0.059) (0.057) (0.122)
∆ log migrant ER -0.202*** -0.110** -0.255*** -0.085 -0.096 -0.339*** -0.293** -0.322***
(0.065) (0.047) (0.076) (0.063) (0.097) (0.106) (0.120) (0.122)
Panel C: Wages (residualized)
∆ log native wages 0.019 0.167** -0.040 0.195*** 0.162* -0.073 -0.034 -0.138
(0.124) (0.077) (0.130) (0.064) (0.091) (0.093) (0.116) (0.139)
∆ log migrant wages -0.032 0.185 -0.112 0.030 0.348 0.005 -0.103* -0.247*
(0.086) (0.183) (0.100) (0.197) (0.221) (0.189) (0.060) (0.130)
Panel D: Housing rents (residualized)
∆ log rents 0.105 0.259** 0.020 0.288** 0.242** 0.103 0.089 -0.050
(0.114) (0.109) (0.109) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.110) (0.209)
∆ log rents: natives 0.145 0.318*** 0.041 0.322*** 0.315*** 0.132 0.064 -0.503**
(0.114) (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) (0.118) (0.115) (0.090) (0.243)
∆ log rents: migrants 0.288*** 0.292*** 0.217** 0.356*** 0.194* 0.203* 0.258** 0.208
(0.102) (0.105) (0.107) (0.136) (0.106) (0.107) (0.111) (0.241)
Panel E: Housing prices (residualized)
∆ log prices 0.319 0.625** 0.321 0.648** 0.603** 0.572** 0.421 0.576*
(0.284) (0.278) (0.291) (0.283) (0.279) (0.288) (0.287) (0.299)
∆ log prices: natives 0.373 0.687** 0.350 0.717*** 0.652** 0.586** 0.413 0.620
(0.278) (0.273) (0.289) (0.274) (0.279) (0.293) (0.276) (0.475)
∆ log prices: migrants 0.428 0.648** 0.423 0.673** 0.575** 0.569** 0.504* 0.574
(0.289) (0.269) (0.298) (0.264) (0.265) (0.281) (0.292) (0.405)
This table reports IV estimates of δ1s in (A46), i.e. the coefficient on CZ-level foreign inflows λˆ
F
rt (instrumented with the migrant shift-share),
estimated for a range of outcomes - both for the full sample and separately by education group. See Appendix F for a description of the
various outcomes. All specifications include 3,610 observations (722 CZs over five decadal periods) with the exception of some migrant-specific
outcomes: in some small CZs, the sample of some census extracts does not include migrants in all education cells. The right hand side of
the estimating equation is identical to that of column 2 (Panel A) of Table 5. All specifications control for a second endogenous variable: the
lagged log employment rate, instrumented with the lagged Bartik. I also control for the current Bartik, year effects and the amenity variables
(interacted with year effects) described in Section 3.4. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Within-area IV estimates of δw1 : Cohort effects
CZs: Pooled cross-sections States: Pooled cross-sections Observations
First stage Full residual Natives First stage Natives Natives CZs States
coefficient contrib: λˆIsrt only: λˆ
I,N
srt coefficient only: λˆ
I,N
srt only: λˆ
I,N
BPsrt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CG / < CG 0.539*** 1.502*** 1.638*** 0.596*** 1.618** 2.245*** 4,332 294
(0.067) (0.295) (0.369) (0.102) (0.663) (0.423)
Coll / < Coll 0.662*** 1.040*** 1.046*** 0.820*** 1.212*** 2.272*** 4,332 294
(0.044) (0.132) (0.162) (0.047) (0.146) (0.206)
HSD / > HSD 0.785*** 0.980*** 1.410*** 0.970*** 1.435*** 1.620*** 4,332 294
(0.031) (0.088) (0.261) (0.033) (0.344) (0.248)
4 edu groups 0.744*** 1.330*** 1.521*** 0.932*** 1.484*** 1.768*** 8,664 588
(0.035) (0.095) (0.209) (0.032) (0.246) (0.195)
This table explores the presence of cohort effects in the pooled cross-section IV estimates of δw1 in equation (37), using a range of
education-based skill delineations. As a reference, the first three columns reproduce the CZ-level pooled cross-section estimates
of δw1 from Table 9 in the main text, based on the three decadal periods between 1970 and 2000. Columns 4 reproduces the
first stage estimates using state-level data (more specifically the 48 states of the continental US plus the District of Columbia).
Column 5 estimates the IV effect of skill-specific foreign inflows λˆFrt on the native contribution to skill s population growth in
state r: i.e. the state-level version of column 3. Column 6 replaces the dependent variable with the contribution of natives to
skill-specific population growth among those born (rather than residing) in state r. All specifications control for both area-year
and skill-year interacted fixed effects. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each
observation is weighted by the lagged cell-specific population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A11: Reconciliation with IV population responses from Cadena and Kovak (2016)
All Natives Mexican Other All Natives Mexican Other
migrants migrants migrants migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Cadena and Kovak’s Panel A, Table 4
W/i-industry shock: group-specific 0.223 0.007 0.992** -0.675** 0.527*** 0.303** 1.103* -0.602
(0.166) (0.090) (0.468) (0.278) (0.168) (0.126) (0.590) (0.496)
Panel B: As above, but replace IndShockgr with ∆ngr
∆ log emp: group-specific 0.301* 0.013 0.771*** 1.413*** 0.540*** 0.366*** 0.839*** 0.957**
(0.170) (0.159) (0.104) (0.356) (0.097) (0.093) (0.128) (0.378)
Panel C: Control for dynamics
∆ log emp: group-specific 0.654*** 0.871** 0.380 1.470*** 0.598*** 0.698 0.930*** 0.798***
(0.199) (0.441) (0.413) (0.552) (0.099) (0.503) (0.266) (0.248)
Log ER in 2006: group-specific 0.680** 0.745*** -2.429 -0.519 0.235 0.826 0.623 -0.669
(0.305) (0.284) (2.651) (2.753) (0.304) (0.969) (2.257) (1.017)
Panel D: First stage for ∆ log emp in Panel C specification
Bartik 2006-10 2.928*** 1.789** 7.805*** -3.342* 2.751*** 2.789*** 4.799** -5.963**
(0.763) (0.734) (1.661) (1.814) (0.764) (0.796) (2.150) (2.363)
Bartik 2000-06 0.223 0.558 -2.013* 1.387 0.494 0.002 0.270 3.671**
(0.575) (0.548) (1.208) (1.337) (0.690) (0.625) (1.444) (1.629)
Panel E: First stage for log ER in 2006 in Panel C specification
Bartik 2006-10 -2.777*** -3.936*** -1.075** -0.643 -1.927** -1.901** -0.937 -0.322
(0.625) (1.352) (0.501) (0.812) (0.753) (0.940) (0.703) (0.812)
Bartik 2000-06 1.402*** 1.507*** 0.029 0.506 1.060* 0.708 0.246 0.704
(0.485) (0.513) (0.303) (0.697) (0.564) (0.756) (0.435) (0.712)
SW F-stats for Panel C
∆ log emp 5.30 5.54 1.05 0.62 10.48 0.77 0.71 2.72
Log ER in 2006 4.94 5.42 0.97 0.32 3.33 0.66 0.57 1.44
Amenity controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
This table offers a reconciliation with Panel A of Cadena and Kovak’s (2016) Table 4. The reported coefficients are estimates of ω1 in
various specifications of equation (A47). All estimates correspond to men with no college education. Throughout, I use Cadena and Kovak’s
sample of 94 MSAs over the period 2006-10. Columns 1-4 of Panel A reproduce Cadena and Kovak’s own estimates of ω1g, instrumenting
the within-industry shock with a Bartik shift-share. Panel B replaces the within-industry shock with the overall change in employment, but
retaining the same instrument. Panel C controls additionally for the lagged employment rate in 2006, which I instrument with a lagged
Bartik shift-share (predicting employment changes in the period 2000-6). Panels D and E report the first stage estimates (for the two
endogenous variables) for the dynamic specification (i.e. with the lagged employment rate). The associated Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016)
F-statistics account for multiple endogenous variables. In line with Cadena and Kovak, all specifications control for the Mexican population
share in 2000 and indicators for MSAs in states that enacted anti-migrant employment legislation. Columns 5-8 control additionally for the
local amenity effects described in Section 3.4 in the main text (using population allocations to map CZ data to MSAs): climate, coastline,
historical population and isolation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A12: Reconciliation with 1985-1990 within-area estimates from Card (2001)
Card (2001): Replication ... with errors ... excluding ... with ... with ... replacing LHS var
175 MSAs, clustered demog remaining full area with λˆIsr,1990, and
weighted by state controls MSAs sample RHS withλˆFsr,1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS
CG / < CG - -0.153 -0.153 -1.948*** -3.270*** -3.595*** -3.878***
(0.441) (0.572) (0.549) (1.124) (1.099) (1.145)
Coll / < Coll - 0.212 0.212 -0.346*** -0.393*** -0.642*** -0.725***
(0.172) (0.248) (0.111) (0.101) (0.143) (0.150)
HSD / > HSD - 0.118 0.118 -0.084 -0.105 -0.259*** -0.291***
(0.101) (0.161) (0.090) (0.088) (0.095) (0.102)
4 edu groups - 0.162 0.162* -0.117 -0.191** -0.349*** -0.409***
(0.103) (0.097) (0.076) (0.096) (0.129) (0.144)
2 occup groups - 0.106 0.106 -0.486*** -0.801*** -0.942*** -1.036***
(0.185) (0.248) (0.145) (0.244) (0.287) (0.299)
6 occup groups 0.25*** 0.214*** 0.214** -0.071 -0.181*** -0.230*** -0.267***
(0.04) (0.045) (0.098) (0.046) (0.055) (0.067) (0.072)
Panel B: IV
CG / < CG - 0.563 0.563 -2.143*** -1.687* -2.350** -2.615***
(1.280) (2.912) (0.750) (0.867) (0.927) (0.949)
Coll / < Coll - 0.389*** 0.389 -0.449*** -0.499*** -0.747*** -0.846***
(0.144) (0.254) (0.132) (0.121) (0.168) (0.175)
HSD / > HSD - 0.297*** 0.297** -0.059 -0.096 -0.262*** -0.295***
(0.080) (0.133) (0.073) (0.071) (0.080) (0.085)
4 edu groups - 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.004 0.041 -0.136 -0.162*
(0.117) (0.118) (0.077) (0.084) (0.086) (0.090)
2 occup groups - 0.244* 0.244 -0.469*** -0.653*** -0.809*** -0.895***
(0.139) (0.298) (0.100) (0.109) (0.138) (0.141)
6 occup groups 0.25*** 0.255*** 0.255** -0.054 -0.123*** -0.169*** -0.192***
(0.05) (0.045) (0.115) (0.043) (0.044) (0.051) (0.053)
This table offers a reconciliation with Card’s (2001) within-area estimates of geographical crowd-out, based on equation (A49). Card’s
OLS and IV estimates of δw1 (for his six-group imputed occupation scheme) are presented in column 1. These are taken from Table 4
of his paper, based on the 175 largest MSAs of the 1990 census extract, with observations weighted by cell populations. (Card reports
his estimates as the effect on aggregate population growth within the cell, but I substract one from his numbers for comparability
with my specification; see Peri and Sparber, 2011.) I attempt to replicate his results in column 2. In columns 3, I cluster standard
errors by state. Column 4 excludes the demographic controls from the regression. Column 5 extends the geographical sample to all
identifiable MSAs (raising the total to 320), and column 6 extends it to cover 49 additional regions consisting of the non-metro areas
in each state (so 369 areas in total). Finally, column 7 replaces the left hand side variable with λˆIsr,1990 and the right hand side variable
with λˆFsr,1990. I present estimates for both Card’s six-group occupation scheme and the other skill delineations described in Appendix
I. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A1: Effect of years in US on cross-state mobility
This figure plots estimates of the log point difference in cross-state mobility between migrants (with given years in the
US) and natives. Estimates are based on complementary log-log models, controlling for a full set of entry cohort effects
and observation year effects. In addition to these, the model in Panel B controls for a full set of age effects. The sample
consists of individuals aged 16-64 in ACS waves between 2000 and 2016. See Appendix C for further details.
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IV
Figure A2: Graphical illustration of crowding out estimates
This figure presents Frisch-Waugh type plots for the δ1 estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. See Appendix E.1. To
restrict the range of the x-axis, I have excluded a small number of outlying data points: 9 observations in the OLS panel
and 15 for IV.
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